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## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### JORDAN BECOMES CENTER FOR MOSLEM BROTHERS' ACTIVITY

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 13 Aug 79 p 31

[Article by Samir Kamal: "Amman Makes Preparations for Centralizing Activity of Moslem Brothers; Amman Receives Leaders of Reactionary Movement, Opens Lines of Communication with Riyadh and with Separatist Forces"]

[Text] Will Jordan become a principal refuge for the reactionary party of the Moslem Brothers? Informed circles in Amman have begun raising numerous questions about what is taking place in the Jordanian capital and especially after the recent regrettable incidents that Syria has experienced. Chief among those incidents was that [which occurred] at the College of Artillery and whose victims were scores of college officers. Informed Arab sources are tying what has happened in Syria with movements on a larger scale that include several Arab capitals among which are Amman and Riyadh. These Arab capitals are providing material and moral support for the Moslem Brothers' Party. Informed Arab sources have assured AL-HURRIYAH that scores of members of the aforementioned movement had left [Lebanon] and sought refuge in Jordan to pursue their activity from the Jordanian capital which is openly embracing the reactionary party. It is known that the Moslem Brothers' Party is the only semi-public party in Jordan. Instead of encountering opposition, this party is being embraced and prepared for dangerous missions in more than one area.

The same Arab sources have assured AL-HURRIYAH that the Syrian Government has so far been able to put an end to 80 percent of the party members in Syria. This may be one of the reasons that led scores of party members to seek refuge in Jordan where the reactionary party, on the other hand, is being protected and embraced.

#### What Is Happening in Jordan

Last July was in fact a month of stepped up activity for the Moslem Brothers' Movement in Jordan. Following the inauguration of the qualification and training centers in the woods of Jarash--whose activity and development are overseen by Crown Prince Hasan himself (see the last issue of AL-HURRIYAH)--

two incidents occurred that are of no less consequence in this area. The first incident pertaining to the earnestness with which the Jordanian government is supporting the Moslem Brothers' Movement. Last July the reactionary Sudanese leader al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, who is well known for his support for the Brothers' Movement and for reactionary forces, received an official invitation from the Jordanian government to visit the capital. The purpose of the visit, as informed Jordanian sources revealed to AL-HURRIYAH, was the joint coordination [of efforts] along the lines of preparing and developing the practices of the movement in more than one Arab capital. Al-Mahdi did in fact come to Amman where he was warmly received by officials of the Jordanian government. Also in Amman al-Sadiq al-Mahdi lectured to a supportive audience in the presence of Jordanian ministers and a number of the leaders of the Moslem Brothers in Jordan. It seems that after this visit and in the course of what transpired during the visit, the Jordanian government did decide to make Amman the center of concentrated activity for the Moslem Brothers, on the one hand, and to place the strings and directions of the movement under its direct supervision, on the other hand. This step is considered one of the forms of confrontation that the Jordanian government has begun to adopt to block the national and progressive forces in Jordan. This means increased reactionary activity for the Brothers, increased suppression and incarceration for the nationalist and progressive elements and increased control of the activity of nationalist and progressive forces in Jordan.

#### Where Are the Weapons Coming From?

It was revealed a few days ago in the Syrian capital that quantities of automatic weapons, individual weapons and hand grenades that were on their way to Syria had been impounded. This transaction was apprehended en route to crossing the Syrian-Jordanian border. The investigation revealed that the weapons smugglers had intended to deliver the weapons to Syrians who belong to the Moslem Brothers' Movement. This incident created a cloud of pessimism and displeasure over the role which Amman is playing and which is gradually being revealed.

The second route which is traversed by the weapons that are smuggled to the Moslem Brothers originates from the Saudi Arabian capital which does not hide its interest in disrupting conditions in the steadfastness and opposition countries and in undermining the positions of those countries which oppose the Camp David Accords. The route begins from Riyadh which sends weapons and funds into the ports of the separatist forces in Lebanon. Those forces in turn undertake the transportation of those funds and weapons through their network of agents to the nationalist Arab countries. But this is not all! The sources of AL-HURRIYAH also assert that another Arab capital which is extremely interested in Syrian conditions is taking part in one way or another in the process of lavishing funds across the separatist Lebanese line to the ports and the suspect retreats of the Moslem Brothers.



### Three Arrows in One Direction

It is thus that Amman, Riyadh and the Lebanese separatist forces come together to point their poisonous arrows against the Arab forces of steadfastness. All this is being prepared with precision that is free from any unexpected occurrences. It is not at all coincidental that the intense, public activity of the Moslem Brothers has mushroomed in Syria and that, especially after the Camp David Accords, coordination and preparation activities have taken place in a number of nationalist Arab capitals where the important site of the Arab Steadfastness and Resistance Front is located to confront the reactionary steps and plans of Camp David. This is the same activity which Cairo is no more remote from than the Jordanian capital. In Cairo itself al-Sadat's government is operating on the same principle which King Husayn's government adopted: "to revive reactionary practices, including the Moslem Brothers' Movement, and to harrass by all means, including direct suppression, the nationalist and progressive forces." The circulation of the bulletin, AL-DA'WAH, has begun to increase in the streets of Cairo and other cities as an expression of the satisfaction of al-Sadat's government with this reactionary activity. It confirms the fact that al-Sadat continues to keep his eyes closed to what the Moslem Brothers' groups are doing in Cairo. [Al-Sadat's government is disregarding this bulletin] specifically because most of its pages praise the Israeli-US-al-Sadat policy and impugn the reputation and prestige of the steadfast Arabs and the Palestinian Revolution. What does Amman want after that? The coming days and months will involve more courage than last July did. They will reveal much more of the serious reactionary role that the capital, Amman, has in store for the Moslem Brothers.



## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### BRIEFS

MOSLEM BROTHERS IN REFUGEE CAMPS--Informed Palestinian sources have assured AL-HURRIYAH that Moslem Brothers have gone into a number of Palestinian camps around the Lebanese capital, Beirut. These sources stated that these elements had come from Jordan "in the name of proselytizing and carrying out religious missionary activity during the holy month of Ramadan." It became evident from their recent, tangible activities that their goals were focused on fighting "communism and imported ideas" and that they were considering this fight their principal battle. On the other hand these sources have revealed that a large number of the aforementioned elements have sought to assure themselves protection by some of the influential elements in "the armed Palestinian struggle" where they have been assured support and encouragement. [Text] [Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 13 Aug 79 p 3] 8592

CSO: 4802

ENEMIES WARNED ISLAMIC FAITH WILL TRUIMPH OVER PERSECUTION

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic Aug 79 pp 4-5

[Editorial by 'Umar al-Talmasani: "This Divine Tide Will Burn Hearts of Enemies; Russia and United States Are Going on With Annihilation of Moslems Because They Constitute Stumbling Block Hampering Spread of Russian and U.S. Principles and Domination; Single-Party System Adopted by Communists Enables Every Ruler To Do What He Pleases Without Deterrence"]

[Text] Examine every state where the majority or the minority is Moslem, what do you find? In the countries populated by an Islamic minority, the ugly, floodlike and sweeping war of annihilation is the policy of the non-Islamic majority--whatever this majority's religion and regardless of whether it is Christian [salibiyah], communist, Buddhist or Zionist. There is no mercy, no morals and no humanity in this policy. It is as if there is in the heart of these majorities a fire that cannot be extinguished except with the blood of the innocent Moslems. What is astounding is that the Islamic minorities are peaceful, cooperative and loyal at a time when you find that the non-Islamic minorities [in the Islamic countries] are rancorous and hostile. You find these minorities harboring devastating enmity and engaging in constant plotting even though they enjoy their full rights and are not oppressed. You find them lamenting and bemoaning their black fortune that has put them at the mercy of the Islamic majority. You find these non-Islamic minorities fabricating lies and false allegations and wailing and mourning their bad luck that has not made them a majority capable of destroying, oppressing and assaulting.

What is most surprising is that despite the absolute fairness in dealing with the non-Islamic minorities in the Islamic countries, the non-Islamic information media and some Islamic information media beat their faces, pull their hair and tear their clothes apart if a single nail of a member of the minorities is scratched or if a single drop of his blood is spilled intentionally or unintentionally. But if the Islamic minority, or Islamic majority, is tortured, driven homeless, its rights confiscated and its members slaughtered, it is as if a sweeping death or a deep silence hits the non-Islamic media which persist in their silence shamelessly while true justice and sincere humanity see and hear, feeling sad and grieved but not being able to do anything else.

## Imperialist, Communist Syria

The gnostic [al-Nasir] Ba'th Party is slaying the Sunni Moslems as hungry wolves slay their gentle and peaceful victims. Syria combines subservience to the two contrasts. Outwardly, it is bright red. Inwardly, it is a surfeited follower of U.S. imperialism. Do not be surprised because the United States is eager to annihilate the Moslems wherever they are, because they are lying in wait for its exploitation. Russia is actively engaged in annihilating the Moslems because they are the stumbling block hampering the spread of its principles. Thus, the two opposites agree on one goal, namely to annihilate the Moslems first and then devote their attention to whatever disagreement they have between them.

If you examine matters more deeply, you find that the Islamic countries are divided into two groups: One allied with communism and the other with capitalism. Those that are allied with the communists have done so because their rulers want to oppress their peoples, and flagrant oppression can be made possible to these rulers only by the communist system--the one-party, one-opinion and one-ruler system under which the ruler does what he pleases without any deterrence and without any comment on his word. Those countries that are allied with capitalism use as a pretext their poverty, weakness and backwardness and their dire need for the capitalist money to relieve them from their crushing crises. The greater the Western support gets and the Western tide rises in an Islamic country allied with the West, the more strongly its rulers disavow the Islamic calls and the more resolutely these rulers fight these calls, both openly and covertly. The victim in both cases is the Islamic call and its advocates, because you can find no ruler allied with the communists or with the democrats--as they allege--who does not believe his ally's view is fighting the Islamic call and its advocates as if this view were his own view. The most dangerous among these rulers are those who repeatedly proclaim the slogans of Islam as their religion and their path while at the same time destroying the Islamic call by way of their fallen information media or by way of the gradual codification of laws which estrange Moslems from their soul and faith. These rulers find for all this many supporters who are supposed to be the advocates and protectors of Islam.

## Russian-American Encouragement

We have at our disposal the names of the advocates of Islam who have been arrested or killed in Syria. We also have at our disposal the facts that are leaked to us day after day. Though Russia claims that it protects peoples from oppression and exploitation, it is blessing, taking part in and supporting the iniquity heaped upon the Moslems. Russia even believes that this iniquity has not reached the level it wants. Even though America raises its voice every now and then to lament and bemoan human rights, it sees, hears, encourages and supports [this iniquity] with all its vastly rich financial resources.

## Islam Is Advancing

Despite all the ugliness, brutality and infernality of all that is happening, the Islamic call is still moving forward and will continue to advance throughout the entire world, and the advocates of Islam are still following one another, whenever one of them is martyred another takes his place. This divine tide is still burning the hearts of the enemies, is causing their blood to burst in their veins and is intensifying their wrath endlessly. The pain of all this makes these enemies wallow more deeply in torturing the Moslems in the hope of alleviating their own pain. But this torture only makes them more frustrated, wrathful, unhappy and lost.

Though the strong are beguiled by their strength and the weak are beguiled by the strength of their strong allies, all this will not do them any good when the Moslems awaken to their laxity in adhering to their faith, when they agree to confront this sweeping flood and when they learn that with their religion, they are the strongest of the strong and are the invincible front that cannot be penetrated because they are with God and in God's company and will, therefore, never be defeated and never vanish.

Islam is staying and will prevail despite all the bad omens. Despair will not enter the hearts of those calling people to God even if they are in the bowels of prisons or hanging from gallows. Faith in God's victory will never desert them for a moment. To them, intensified oppression and aggression are perhaps the beginning of victory. No crisis escalates without finally relaxing, and no catastrophe reaches its darkest proportions without a morrow of success following.

## Fruits for Those Who Fear God

Let al-Asad of Syria, the field marshal [al-Bakr] of Baghdad, Marcos and Mengistu and the others like them--though their names and their methods may differ--persist in their transgression because their end is certain and definite. There is no better proof of this than the vitality of the advocates of Islam and the influence of the Islamic faith on their determination and their thoughts. They sleep on bitter torture and awaken to green hope, and God will never forget their work.

If they lack material strength and human support at present, then they are no dearer to God than His prophet who used to pass by the persecuted and weak Moslems with nothing to give them in support other than the words: Be patient, Yasir clan. There is nothing that I can do to help you, but your appointment is with paradise.

Don't the persecuted and tortured advocates like to have an appointment with paradise and don't those who sympathize with the Islamic call and its advocates like their situation to be like that of the prophet, may God's prayers and peace be upon him, when he could do nothing to defend his persecuted followers or change their condition?

We are lying in wait for those who are attacking, fighting and persecuting our religion everywhere in the world. We are lying in wait until one of two good things happens: Either imminent victory and triumph from God for those preaching His name and torture for their enemies from God or on our hands, or noble martyrdom and everlasting heaven. Tell the faithful that the fruits are reaped by those who fear God.

8494

CSO: 4802

BA'THIST ANTI-ISLAMIC POSITIONS DENOUNCED

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic Aug 79 pp 8-9

[Article by 'Abd-al-Mun'im Salim Jabbarah: "Moslems Between Revolutionary Purity and White Revolutions"]

[Text] The tragedy in Syria is not the tragedy of the Moslem Brotherhood alone but of the entire Syrian people, and the tragedy in the Islamic world is not the tragedy of Islamic Syria alone but that of all the Islamic peoples.

The tragedy of the Moslems in Syria--and the Islamic world in its entirety is a Syria nowadays--did not start today. The first step of this tragedy in its course toward its peak started with the 1949 coup of Husni al-Za'im. This tragedy has reached its peak with the gnostic [al-Nasiri] Ba'th Party's assumption of power in Damascus and with the rise of military, socialist, nationalist and revolutionary regimes in various countries.

In the early 1940's, four currents were active on the stage of the Islamic world:

1. A regional current advocating a new Phoenicianism, Pharaohism and Assyrianism.
2. A nationalist current advocating Arab nationalism as a bond among the Arabs--a bond not related to religion.
3. A limited Marxist current whose seeds were planted by the Jews in some circles and which advocated the proletarian bond throughout the world and also advocated following Moscow's course as mounts, even as the tails of mounts, following the lead camel.
4. The Islamic current which as the most serious and which started to grow vigorously in the 1940's. This current raised the banner of returning to Islam and disowning whatever is alien because salvation and the cure lie in returning to true originality.



It alarmed the forces which inherited the area from the British and French colonialism to see plants raised by hundreds of years of colonization, missionary work, malice and plotting being almost uprooted. Therefore, it was not surprising to find the new heirs coming up with something new to tighten their grip on the camel's halter and to finish the captive lion before it could free itself of its shackles.

The experiment started with Husni al-Za'im's coup, and then similar coups took place from ocean to ocean. Numerous slogans were raised to polarize the masses and to block the path in the face of the advocates of Islam. The slogans of revolutionism, socialism and nationalism, of rebelling against corruption and creating strong national armies to get rid of foreign domination were also raised. The one-party experiment was started and was accompanied by the slogans of leftism and of the inevitability of the socialist solution.

Under the canopy of all these new systems, the entire Islamic world took its first steps on the path toward the peak of its tragedy.

A group of officers and some troops topple a dilapidated and rotten regime and announced their declarations in an early morning and then a soldier assumes power in the name of revolution against corruption and corrupters, in the name of revolutionary purity and of revolutionary solutions. The valiant lieutenant colonel becomes the sole leader in Baghdad or the leader president, leader teacher and source of wisdom in Damascus or some other capital. Titles and names which sounded in fact like a cat imitating a lion were heard repeatedly and the regimes began to play their role, supported by strong intelligence and by armies armed not to repel the usurper but to support the ruler specifically. I believe that none of us have forgotten the words of the inspired leader [presumably Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir] to the ambassador of a certain state when he met with him while the demonstrations were making angry threats in the wake of the 1967 crime and when the leader said: "If you don't give us weapons, we will not be able to push these masses back." The strong information media also started to raise their voices in every direction, painting halos over the heads of the leaders and the regimes and attacking the honorable opponents without giving them a chance to defend themselves and to refute the accusations.

#### War Against Islam

Those regimes played their role in fighting Islam and in laying snares for its advocates. They started covertly and then proceeded to fight it openly and boastfully in word and deed. They started with attacks against the persons of the advocates of Islam, with casting doubts on them and with making all kinds of charges against them. The regimes then started to attack the principles. In their baseness, they then affronted God's shari'a and book and the sunna and person of His prophet, may God's prayers and peace be upon him. They coupled all this with measures to shackle or to destroy the [Islamic] movement.



Saddam Husayn, the unsuccessful law student and the Ba'thist leader now dominating Iraq and issuing legislation, against God's will, for the Iraqi people, says:

"Our belief is not the outcome of whatever the past and religion bear. It is a comprehensive and advanced view. We are required to be against the politicization of religion. Our Ba'thist belief is not a copy of any analysis or on a religious basis. Our party is not a new religious doctrine but a new secular doctrine."

In his booklet "The Arab Prophet," Michel 'Aflaq, the rancorous crusader, the legislator and the theoretician of the Ba'thists, says: "Islam is an Arab movement. Its comprehension of things proceeded from an Arab viewpoint. The meaning that Islam expresses in this decisive phase is that all efforts be channelled toward advancing the Arabs and that all the efforts be confined within the framework of the Arab nation."

As for al-Qadhdhafi, the legislator for Libya against God's will, he said in an interview with the French LE MONDE at (Lapaz) Hotel in Paris on 24 November 1973:

(1) "The endeavor to build Arab nationalism is a return to originality. Reviving Arab nationalism is modernization. (2) Socialism is man's endeavor throughout the ages to reach a better life. What is said about an imaginary, a realistic or an Islamic socialism constitutes a single chain in man's struggle. Islam did not come with a new socialism but crowned the human efforts to achieve social justice. (3) In Islam, there is no problem that requires secularism because Islam itself is secular. The Libyan Republic is the model of socialism. There is no conflict between Islam and socialism." (4) On Ataturk, al-Qadhdhafi says: "Ataturk's movement is a confirmation of history's analysis, namely that history is moved by nationalism and religion. Turkey's movement before Ataturk was a religious movement. When Ataturk came, the role of the national factor appeared."

It is well-known that England declared in the wake of World War I--it then represented the major power in the area--its conditions for reaching a settlement with Turkey, including the following:

1. Abolition of the caliphate.
2. Severing every relation between Turkey and religion.
3. Installing a civil constitution instead of the shari'a.

Ataturk implemented all this and formed a strong army, which was supported by both the communist East and the crusader West, to strengthen this course. This is not different from what is happening at present and what has been happening since World War II. The only difference lies in the method of production, in taking the modernization requirements into consideration and

in exploiting the resources of the age. The goal is the same, namely to strike Islam, to guarantee the interests, to tie the area to the new heirs and to give the alien entity the opportunity to prevail and dominate.

#### Gnostic [Nasiriyah] Ba'thists and Islam

The question that dictates itself is: Is what is being done by the Ba'thists at present an exception to this course or a deviation from this path? This question is followed by another, namely: What is the difference between the gallows that have already been erected and that are still being erected by the criminal Ba'thists for the Islamic tide in Syria, and the gallows that 'Abd-al-Nasir erected for the Islamic tide in Egypt, the bullets that the shah directed to the hearts of the advocates and the bloodshed in Aden? Perhaps the Ba'th is characterized exclusively by several qualities that make it superior to many other regimes in its hostility and criminality toward Islam. (1) The Syrian Ba'th is represented today by the al-Nasiriyah sect [or the 'Alawites] about which Ibn Taymiyah, may God be pleased with him, said: "Those people that are called al-Nasiriyah are more infidel than the infidel and their harm is greater. They pretend among ignorant Moslems to be Shi'ites and to support the Prophet's tribe, whereas they believe in neither God nor His prophet." (2) The Nasiriyah followers have their long and wide history of assisting and of being agents for every foreigner, such as the Crusaders, the Tatars and the French. The French called al-Nasiriyah followers the 'Alawites and bestowed their favors on them, as they did with the Maronites in Lebanon.

(3) The Ba'th, which originally rose on the shoulders of the Crusaders and was weaned by the Western colonialism in Rome, Paris and London on the milk of nationalism and of hostility to religion--especially Ba'thists such as Zaki al-Arsuzi, Salah Bitar and Michel 'Aflaq--is now rising on the shoulders of al-Nasiriyah, in its name and for its interest. (4) The Ba'th has written with completely dirty fingers the incidents of its treason in the pages of Syria's history, beginning with the surrender of the Golan in 1967 before a single Jewish foot had stepped on it, with the agreements concluded with the United States in June 1967 to preserve the status quo in the Golan in return for Syrian commitments to resettle the refugees in other areas, to ban the fedayeen from entering the occupied territories and then to liquidate the Palestinians and form the Palestinian al-Sa'iqah Organization to serve the Ba'th's purposes and achieve the goals of the Jews and of Washington by stopping at the red line in southern Lebanon and never crossing it and ending with its cooperation with the Maronites.

#### No Differences Between Comrades

There is no difference between the revolutionary comrades in their hostility toward Islam and in their position toward the Islamic issues.

In the days of the inspired leader ['Abd-al-Nasir], some revolutionaries wrote in the Egyptian press: "Our hostility is not directed against the 2.5 million

Jews, especially their workers and peasants, but against the Israeli system as a racial entity exploiting the masses."

A revolutionary Nasirist in Syria said that he rejects the slogan of nationalism against the Jewish invasion and favors a war against the reactionary Arab states to war against Israel, because the number one enemy is Islam.

In their publication, AL-QA'IDAH [Base], the Iraqi communists have said that the Iraqi people refuse proudly to fight the fraternal Israeli people. Boumediene, the former Azharite, disavowed Algeria's Islam and Algeria's revolution, issued imprisonment and detention sentences against the advocates of Islam and appointed atheists and agents to the seats of power in Algeria.

### Is There a Way?

The hidden has been exposed and the facts have become clear. In the mind of peoples, socialism and nationalism have become nothing but means of deception, delusion, oppression and tyranny.

From bitter experience, people have come to realize that revolutionary purity is nothing but a million pounds "in loose change" in the pocket of a revolutionary, that the white [bloodless] revolutions are nothing but swords to cut off the heads of honorable people, that the revolutionary ruler's fight against the corruption of the traditional rulers is nothing but further corruption, that the slogans of freedom and democracy for peoples are nothing but a falsification of the peoples' will and a further sinking of people to the abyss of slavery, that the various titles and descriptions given to the revolutionary leaderships are nothing but lies made by the hired media, that this purity is the sound of bullets killing innocent people and lynching ropes killing tens of the advocates of Islam. Deep-red blood is flowing on the soil of Damascus, Aleppo and Hamah. But all this cannot keep the masses away from the advocates of Islam and is no longer useful in the face of generations and generations that are picking up the banner [of Islam]. This is why the threads of hope in the gloomily dark night of the East have not been torn, and why the new dawn that will carry away oppression and the oppressors is not far away.

1. The regimes hostile to Islam commit their crime only when they feel weak, when they feel the strength of the Islamic tide, when their attention is drawn to an internal danger threatening their common interests or when the area is on the threshold of new solutions for its problems or is about to embark on a new chapter of its history. All this indicates the presence of Islam.

2. The Islamic tide which has proven its firmness and the depth of its roots has found its place in the minds and hearts of the masses who have come to distinguish the true from the false. Fighting the advocates of Islam and heaping accusations against them has turned out to be nothing but medals on the chests of these advocates.

3. Today, while all the forces of evil are uniting their efforts against Islam and when the Western owl hoots whenever it feels the danger of Islam, the reality makes it inevitable for the advocates to unite their efforts and their methods.

4. If the phase of the tragedy required insistence on Islam as a course and a system, then the phase of the peak of the tragedy requires still further determination. After the peak, there is nothing but proceeding on the right path securely, peacefully and in a light embracing the horizons.

5. The advocates of the Islamic tide, which is accustomed to emerging from its tribulations stronger, firmer and deeper, are not unaware of all the bitter experiences and lessons of the past, of the enormous responsibility and duty and of the importance of insisting on the message. This tide is the hope of the masses in Syria and outside it to overcome the tragedy in Syria and outside it.

8494

CSO: 4802

SYRIAN BA'THISTS SAID ENGAGED IN CAMPAIGN TO LIQUIDATE MOSLEM BROTHERHOOD

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic Aug 79 p 10

[Article: "Statement by Moslem Brotherhood in Syria"]

[Text] Capt Ibrahim Yusuf, who planned the massacre [not further identified] and supervised its implementation, is a Sunni Ba'thist officer whose command entrusted him with the duty of security officer of the Artillery Officers College in Aleppo. Because the security of the military sectors is of the highest degree of importance, only those with the highest degree of loyalty and allegiance are chosen for this task. So what happened?

A few months ago and in the wake of increased sectarian 'Alawite provocations by the college's 'Alawite students, numbering 286 out of a total of 300 students enrolled in the course--the remaining 14 students are Sunnis, Christians and Druzes--and in the wake of the death of the aforementioned captain's brother on the hands of the 'Alawites during the period of conflict between the Ba'th factions in Iraq and Syria, a verbal argument took place between Capt Ibrahim Yusuf on the one hand and a group of the college students and of Hafez al-Asad's relatives on the other. The argument ended in a violent clash as a result of which Capt Ibrahim Yusuf was taken to the hospital. Matters became tense in the military command and in the Ba'th Party's Regional Command in Syria. The situation almost reached the point of explosion but was obviated by the two sides, matters were settled through a reconciliation between the two clashing groups and a normal situation was apparently restored. But the said captain began to plan to avenge his dignity and that of his brother before him. He prepared some of the Sunni Ba'thist elements in the school and sought the help of Cpl 'Abd-al-Rashid Husayn and began to train him outside the college so that he may act, when needed, as an officer with the rank of lieutenant colonel. At the time set for implementation, the captain gathered the college students at a late hour of the night on the pretext of meeting Lt Col (actually corporal) 'Abd-al-Rashid Husayn, the envoy of the college director. When all the students came to the meeting and when he made sure that the other elements following him had taken control of the telephone exchange and had detained the guards, the captain gave his orders to another group of elements which had taken their positions on the



windows of the meeting hall to carry out the massacre. The captain and his followers then escaped, having avenged himself and his brother.

This massacre was destined to break the strong information blackout in Syria. Similar massacres had been carried out earlier, and here are some examples:

### 1. Al-Itfa'iyah Massacre:

Nearly a month and a half ago, a violent clash took place in the al-Itfa'iyah [Fire Department] area in Damascus between units of the military police and other units of defense companies that are under the command of Rif'at al-Asad. Machinegun fire and hand grenades were exchanged for almost 2 hours, and nearly 60 elements were killed or wounded as a result. But the massacre was kept under cover and the issue was settled out of concern for the regime's safety and reputation and so as not to show this regime as weak and divided.

### 2. Ministry of Interior Massacre:

The al-Itfa'iyah incident caused Brig Gen 'Adnan al-Dabbagh, the minister of interior, to complain, because the massacre shook his position strongly at all levels and because it showed him as weak and incapable of establishing security in the country. It was as if the incident was the storm that blew up his security efforts in Damascus.

The minister held Rif'at al-Asad responsible for the incident and the situation between the two became tense. 'Adnan al-Dabbagh issued his instructions to the security units under his control to keep an eye on the conduct of the units of the defense companies and to prevent them from tampering with the citizen's security. Matters between the two sides deteriorated, and the defiance of Rif'at al-Asad reached the point where he ordered his special units to flex their muscles in front of the Ministry of Interior. 'Adnan al-Dabbagh's followers confronted those units, the situation erupted with a violent clash with automatic weapons and hand grenades, and a number of elements of both sides were killed or wounded. In the same manner as before and with a spirit of sportsmanship, the page of this massacre was turned over at the level of the information media. But the massacre was exposed, like the previous one, by eyewitnesses.

### 3. Dayr al-Zawr Massacre:

Approximately 2 years ago, a disagreement broke out between 1st Lt Fawzi Hasir, a Sunni officer from the area of Dar'a in southern Syria, and an 'Alawite lieutenant colonel as a result of the sale of a car. The 'Alawite lieutenant colonel wanted to use his command position to impose on the junior officer conditions which the latter rejected. The situation became tense and the 'Alawite officer started to insult the Sunni officer in front of the troops and of his colleagues. The latter's dignity and pride started to boil inside him, and he picked up his automatic rifle and felled the lieutenant colonel and six lieutenants and noncommissioned officers who were with him.

He then got into a military vehicle and headed for the Iraqi borders which are adjacent to the area. But he lost his way in the desert and ran out of fuel. Helicopters caught up with him and brought him back to Dayr al-Zawr, where he was executed by a firing squad.

#### 4. Front (Syrian Borders With Golan) Massacre:

While 'Ali al-Zir, a Sunni draftee from the area of Latakia, was performing his prayers at camp, a number of 'Alawite and Christian troops gathered around him and started to shout, ridiculing him and his prayer. One of them even tried to expose the draftee's private parts by pulling down his trousers. But the brother held himself together and maintained his self-control until he finished his prayers and then walked to his tent with utter calm while they were still ridiculing him. He picked up his rifle from the tent, returned to them and felled them. He then proceeded to the camp commander, presented himself with utter dignity and admitted his action. The camp commander contacted the higher command which ordered that a field trial be held for that brother who was zealous for his religion. He was executed in the camp yard.

#### 5. Iraqi Ba'th's Massacres:

Throughout the 5 years of conflict between the Iraqi and Syrian factions of the Ba'th Party, the Iraqi Ba'th carried out several massacres and individual assassinations. Syria issued official statements on those acts, holding the Iraqi Ba'th responsible for the crimes. On the other hand, the Syrian Ba'th carried out massacres and acts of assassination in Iraq. The victims of one such act were the son of Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, Iraq's ruler, and some other members of his family. But faster than light, the two criminals embraced as if nothing had happened.

If this is the true situation of the repeated massacres in Syria, what connection do the Moslems [presumably meaning Moslem Brotherhood] have with them and why is the Aleppo massacre attributed to them?

O Moslems, it is our firm conviction that anybody with an alert mind and everyone who has been keeping up with the reports reiterated explicitly or implicitly by the world press agencies is not unaware of the increased activity of the Islamic movements in the area recently.

Even though Syria is the Arab country nominated primarily by the U.S. and international circles to perform a role similar to that performed by some other Islamic countries, the difficulty faced by the international and local diplomatic circle arises from the fact that the sectarian position of the ruling regime in Syria requires extensive preparation among circles of the Syrian people. One of the most obvious and important factors of this preparation is to weaken or get rid of the Islamic voice that is serious in its positions toward the Palestinian cause. The most prominent and strongest among the Islamic voices is that of the Moslem Brotherhood. This is why the 'Alawite



authorities started, without any advance warning or any immediate reasons, to storm Moslem Brotherhood members in their homes and to yank them out from among their families and from their places of work and lodge them in jails. The number of those arrested in the various Syrian provinces has reached 300 so far. The number of those arrested on the suspicion of having contacts with the Moslem Brotherhood reached 2,500 persons in the period from 5 Dhi al-Hijjah till just before the Aleppo massacre.

Meanwhile, the Moslem Brotherhood members have faced all forms of barbaric and inhuman torture. 'Umar Salim, a member of the Moslem Brotherhood from Aleppo who was a third-year student at the School of Engineering, enraged the 'Alawites with his steadfastness in jail, and so they decided to kill him, and did so. They then burned him and put his lifeless and pure body in a box which they took to his family, claiming that he had committed suicide during the interrogation to conceal serious matters undermining the country's security. But they refused to deliver the box to his family and they buried him under their own supervision and guard. Moreover, they storm from time to time the families of the Brotherhood members and enter their homes on the pretext of searching for documents and weapons, without any consideration for human values. They terrorize women and children at late hours of the night. Some of them even use the homes of the brothers as a trap to arrest whoever comes enquiring about the detainees' families or offering them any aid to enable them to buy just their daily needs. The aim of all these rash acts and desperate attempts is to provoke the brothers who are outside the jails and to push them toward actions which the government could then use as a pretext and a justification before the people for liquidating and killing the Moslem Brotherhood members. But the members have exercised self-restraint and have advised each other to do so because the Godly character and upbringing with which they have been implanted prevents them from any action that could undermine the principles of the faith in which they believe and because they have pledged to God to remain loyal to these principles and to struggle for them in the manner that pleases their God and that realizes their goals through legitimate means and methods.

God, may He be praised, willed that the Aleppo massacre take place in the aforementioned manner, and this massacre provided the 'Alawite government with the golden opportunity and with the sweeping wave that is easy to ride toward achieving its goals. The massacre even gave them a big window from which to look down on the Syrian people, to play with their sentiments and to prepare for a massacre for which their rancorous hearts and their sly sectarianism had long yearned so that they may liquidate the cream of the steadfast Moslem youth, so that they may have the stage all for themselves and so that they may later realize their masters' goals without any opposition. And this is what has happened and this is how the pure and guiltless Moslem youth have been killed. Their only crime was that they were Moslems who said "God is our God" and that they devoted themselves to their God, to their nation and to humanity which is nowadays lost amidst the heap of positional principles. They died while seeming to say: "Sentence any way you like, because your sentence affects only this worldly life." Their souls

are now green birds flying freely in the vastness of paradise and that go to sleep under the light of candles made of gold and hung unto the throne of the Compassionate. Blessed are you, O Moslem brothers, for your present situation. Now you meet the beloved Muhammad and his companions. Our last invocation is thanks to God, the master of the universe.

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## IRAN

### KHOMENI TIGHTENS IDEOLOGICAL REINS

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 24 Aug 79 p 1

[Article by Christian Schmidt-Haerter]

[Text] The Iranian revolution devours Allah's helmsmen. Khomeyni has launched civil war against the leftist liberals and now also against the Kurds. He has led "Mohammed's state" from modern exploitation back into the depressing Middle Ages. However, since it was particularly this country with its petroleum that fed the sources of the Western growth society to such a conspicuous extent, it also became a potential center for international conflict. At the end of this week, the leader of the Shiitic Muslims issued a call for general mobilization, not against foreign interventionist schemes but against the Kurds whose insurrection the Ayatullah intended to crush within 24 hours. A short time later a military communique advised him otherwise: peace prevails throughout the country.

It sounds absurd but there is system in it. The man who intended to be nothing else but spiritual councillor of the nation is turning into a theocratic ruler. His populism is being forced—increasingly so by growing failures—toward party dictatorship with claims to infallibility. The sacral aura becomes pretence for despotism (pure and simple).

The Western democracies followed the first phase of the Islamic inquisition with horror, but also with a bad conscience. After all it had been these countries that had contributed by constantly growing expectations of oil shipments and by investment purchases of the shah, to the intensive penetration of Iran by Western influences, to an all too superficial modernization and to the identity crisis among the Iranian people. Is it not easy to understand that the Islamic fanaticism, traumatic as such, thought to re-discover the old enemy of Allah in the materialistic life style of the West? The West discovered to its horror that the mullahs did not practice law but revenge—still, here was the great majority of a people starting out on a search for its own history.

In the second stage of his march into the past, Khomeyni has now cast off his religious cloak. The Islamic revolutionary justice, which soon surpassed the military court justice of the shah, did not fully satisfy the Ayatullah anymore. Khomeyni declared that gallows should have been erected on all major places and only one party, the party of God, should be permitted. To the extent that the Islamic doctrine of salvation fails to bring salvation in the social reality, produces unemployment and drives experts and specialists away, the Ayatullah resorts more and more to the classical repertory of all totalitarian rulers. In the same manner as sharpened dogmatism under a communist regime, the Islamic fundamentalism of Khomeyni—his clinging to the holy text—is to justify his absolute claim and his intolerance of any opposition.

Military men have been, and are still being executed because under the shah's regime they had fired on the population. But now they are again supposed to do the same thing—to fire on the Kurdish minority. As in all other countries that have acquired minorities in past days of expansionism, the dogmatic centralism in Iran also encounters resistance from ethnic groups. The Kurds took part in the insurrection against the shah, but not so much for the revolution as for their own autonomy. There is also a certain method in the way the leader of the Shi'ite Muslims one day condemns the Sunnite Kurds as infidels and the next day embraces them as brothers. Khomeyni tries to split the movement for autonomy because any concession would serve as example for other minorities to follow, and there is quite a disgruntled Arab population settled at the sources of Persian wealth, in the petroleum province of Khuzistan.

The minorities call for help—from anyone, from Waldheim to PLO chief Arafat. The big powers are holding back. As long as Khomeyni is supported by a revolutionary council that is devoted to him, as long as his popularity is unbroken, the Americans and the Soviets will not dare to actively interfere. Moscow cannot risk to jeopardize its long-term policy toward the Arabs, nor can it risk to infuriate the Islamic subcultures in the Soviet republics of Central Asia. However, Khomeyni's authority, so far unbroken among the majority of Iranians, holds the danger that he will ruin his country completely before he himself with his Koran will have reached the end of his rope.

What will follow on all these illusions? Iran is shaped by the Shi'ite branch of Islam, which is more populist and socially engaged than the Sunnite branch. There could be an opportunity for a social-revolutionary movement of rejuvenation with communist participation. In that case Moscow could take a big step forward under certain circumstances. At present the Soviet Union is not inclined toward riskier experiments. The impending "hanging of the guards" in the krenlin is not a time for great adventures.

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## BACKGROUND OF RECENT COUP ATTEMPT ANALYZED

London 8 DAYS in English 11 Aug 79 p 23

[Article by Peter Mansfield]

[Text] AN INTERNAL upheaval in Iraq is of great importance to the whole Gulf area — especially now that Baghdad is taking a full part in plans for increased regional cooperation. It also affects the balance of power within the Arab world. There are sound historical reasons for seeing the history of the Fertile Crescent in terms of struggle between the rulers of the valleys of the Nile and the Tigris for influence over the Syrian heartland. In the 1950s it was Nuri Said versus Nasser; 20 years later it is Saddam versus Sadat. An over-simplification of course but it has a sound basis of truth.

Unfortunately, the latest events in Baghdad are more than usually difficult to interpret; experienced Middle Eastern analysts have never been in such disarray. Consider the various theories that have been put forward — mainly from Beirut, which may have lost its pre-eminence as the financial centre of the Levant but remains unchallenged as the clearing-house for political rumours. First there was the suggestion that the five leading conspirators in the plot against the regime were pro-Soviets who were alarmed by Iraq's recent conciliatory moves towards the West and the growing breach with both Moscow and the Iraqi Communist Party. There was a counter-theory that the plot was aimed to push Iraq towards acceptance of the Israeli-Egyptian Treaty and this drew some support from the official Iraqi statement.

There was also a suggestion that it is primarily a Shiite revolt. It has become something of a cliché to ascribe all unrest in Iraq to resentment by the Shiite majority

against the monopoly of political power by the Sunnis. However, first reports that four of five of the leading alleged conspirators were Shiites now turn out to be untrue. Then there is the question of the position of the former president Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Did he, as David Hirst of the *Guardian* confidently asserts, resign rather than retire after refusing to sign the death sentences for a number of army officers and Shiite mullahs because he was 'old, sick and tired and about to meet his maker'? The special session of the Iraqi Baath regional conference and the Revolutionary Command Council held on 22 July went out of its way to scotch this suggestion by expressing 'high appreciation and profound admiration for father leader comrade Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr'. This of course does not prove that there was no rift between Bakr and his successor Saddam Hussein but his resignation could very well have been due to bad health. He has been known to have wanted to resign for some time but his remaining in office, even as a figurehead, was important to Saddam Hussein as a guarantee of the support of the armed forces for the regime. Although Saddam Hussein became an honorary general following his role in the suppression of the Kurdish rebellion of 1974-75, he is a civilian and there is always the danger that some senior officers will resent his position as the country's leader.

But perhaps most important of all is a declaration in the joint Baath and RCC statement that 'the conspirators had been in contact with an external quarter which the leadership finds it is not in the best national-

ist interest to expose now'. The identification of this 'external quarter' gave rise to a flurry of suggestions: Libya, the PDRY (with which Iraq's relations have recently deteriorated because of the assassination of an Iraqi communist exile in Aden by killers allegedly sent from Baghdad), Khomeini's Iran (through the Shiite connection again) and finally Syria. This last does seem the most probable because it is something which the Iraqi leadership would most want to keep quiet. A new breach with Syria would mean the collapse of the anti-Sadat front. There is no doubt at all that during the long and bitter dispute between the Syrian and Iraqi Baathist regimes which lasted with only brief respites from July 1968 to November 1978 that each was doing its best to subvert the other. The question is whether Syria continued to do this after the official reconciliation of last November. Some Palestinian sources in Beirut have suggested that the Syrian plan was to use Syrian parachutists dressed in Iraqi uniforms to carry out a coup in Baghdad which would have made Hafez Assad president of a united Iraqi-Syrian state with Abdul Khalek Samarra'i, who has been under house arrest for some years in Baghdad, as vice-president. It is hard to believe that President Assad, with his natural cau-

tion, could have favoured such a crack-brained scheme which would certainly have failed.

One returns finally to the simple explanation that Saddam Hussein, after taking over the presidency, is strengthening his own position by eliminating all potential opposition. This does not explain everything because two of the leading alleged conspirators — Adnan Hussein and Mohammed Mahjoub — were members of the new cabinet appointed by Saddam Hussein himself on 16 July. (There could be an analogy with President Sadat's counter-coup against his own vice-president and ministers in May 1971.) But for some time there have been indications that despite Saddam Hussein's commanding position in the regime there have been some elements who disputed his policy decisions. This could explain why the clear moves to improve commercial relations with Britain which resulted from Lord Carrington's visit to Baghdad was followed by the unexplained arrest of the British businessman John Smith. It should become apparent before long whether President Saddam Hussein does have control and whether he regards Syria as implicated in the conspiracy. However, it may still be considered against the 'nationalist interest' to say so publicly.



## ATTENTION URGED TO DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ARAB MINORITY

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 15 Aug 79 p 9

[Article by Meron Benvenisti: "Undisguised Discrimination"]

[Text] The partial cancellation of the subsidies aroused, as expected, powerful demands for compensation payments appropriate for the distressed social strata and the wage-workers. Amid the wave of protests and reactions the government's decision to limit the partial compensation for price inflation only to "persons eligible for military service" aroused no special attention. That is to say, it deliberately excluded the entire Arab population from eligibility.

Discrimination in the payment of national security allowances is nothing new. There has been a gap between the Jewish and Arab populations for years, but until now it has been based on the calculation of allowances, and when the payments were updated, they were increased in equal proportion. Now the government has established a precedent by cutting out the effect of price inflation only with respect to the Arab segment, and thereby added discrimination to discrimination. No government spokesman bothered to explain why this arbitrary decision was accepted. Probably they knew that the discussion would not revolve around it, and if someone did notice it, it would be accepted without being understood. As for the Arab community, if they complained and demonstrated, their protest could always be presented as a provocation against the government.

Of itself, discrimination in giving compensation for price inflation is but a side issue, and it might have been possible to ignore it if it had not happened in association with other disquieting signs. On the day this decision was taken, the medical diagnosis of the Northern District Commander for the Arabs of Galilee was published; a week previously the government insisted on passing the law on the expropriation of the Bedouin lands in the Negev at its first reading; at the same time bulldozers continued to prepare government land in Galilee for the erection of watchtowers to defend land "to prevent its being stolen by Arabs." Some time before this the Chief of the General Staff reduced the sentence of an officer who had been convicted of killing



Lebanese villagers. In this connection we may recall the clemency granted the reservist who was convicted of killing an Arab citizen in east Jerusalem. At the Supreme Court the petitions of dozens of West Bank villagers concerning the seizure of their lands are in a suspended state. A few months ago the prime minister's adviser on Arab affairs resigned in protest over the government's handling of minority affairs. With the acts of authority went harsh words. The combination of these events, the association of these occurrences must give rise to gloomy reflections on the future of inter-ethnic relationships in Israel.

#### Emphasizing that They Are Foreigners

The discrimination against the Arab minority dates from the beginning of the state of Israel. The Arabs of Israel live in the shadow of discrimination in almost every walk of life. Any novelty introduced by the present government is in style, not in content. Until now the discrimination has been explained by "practical" or "objective" excuses, such as security sensitivity, differences in way of life, or the exemption from military service. Now it seems that the government has shaken off such delicacies of style. The repression of the Arabs as Arabs is no longer embarrassing, and there is no need to mask it with patriotic excuses. On the contrary, it seems that emphasizing that they are a foreign element and the flowering of comprehensive accusations have become routine. If this is how those in authority behave, it is no wonder that certain circles permit themselves to express their prejudices publicly, and use insulting language concerning the Arab minority.

In general the discrimination against the Arabs of Israel has particularly worried civil rights workers, who are concerned about the ethical image of the state. And indeed the norms of double standard and inequality that are so rooted in the attitudes toward the minority must cause concern, because it is the nature of repression to start in a limited segment and spread slowly and become a system that injures the weak social strata that are not represented among the ruling elites.

To legitimize ethnic-religious prejudices and xenophobic impulses leads to the corruption of the entire political and social body. But apparently these considerations seem "refined" or "leftist" in the eyes of many, so the protest of the civil rights workers has not impressed anyone. If criticism based on justice and morality is unconvincing, perhaps the arguments of "practical men," based on utility and scientific analysis, will be convincing.

#### Reliable Recipe

The typical Israeli approach is to see our problems and difficulties as peculiar to ourselves, unlike anything else in the whole world. But in truth the inter-ethnic relations in Israel are not exceptional in their gravity or in the gravity of their expression. The tensions between consolidated groups possessing different cultural and political identities and living under one authority are a universal phenomenon. The roots and the stimuli of the conflicts are many and varied. But their dynamics is remarkably alike.

The phenomenon is so widespread, in east and west, in Europe and the Third World, that the political scientists and those in related professions have developed a special branch that specializes in ethnic conflicts, their roots, their developments, and the ways to solve them.

Anyone who traces the deterioration of Jewish-Arab relations will discover a surprising and disquieting resemblance in dynamics to majority-minority relations in many other countries of the world: economic and social discrimination against the minority; clear-cut domination by the majority, without minority participation in the ruling circles; pressure of majority national objectives and cultivation of symbols and values with which the minority cannot identify; presentation of every expression of separate identity and every desire to develop an attachment to the minority's ethnic heritage as blasphemy and treason; weakness in educating the majority to respect the rights of the minority; lack of enforcement of laws against repression, and enactment of laws against repression, and enactment of laws that institutionalize it; lack of attention to uprooting of prejudice, neglect and lack of understanding of the minority heritage, while cultivating the majority's feeling of cultural and material superiority--all these constitute a reliable recipe for the outbreak of open and bitter inter-ethnic conflict.

This conflict is easy to kindle, but almost impossible to extinguish after the point of no return has been passed. It is not necessarily expressed violently. The stage of violence and terror is only the beginning of the process. The coalescing of the minority around a leadership that chooses to utilize the democratic process for its separatist struggle, and consistently makes use of nonviolent civil disobedience, presents serious challenges to the majority, draining the vigor of the state and liable to paralyze the democratic system. Such a gloomy prospect has not yet materialized in Israel, but we are not immune to it.

Many will wish to believe that "it can't happen here," and they will base their complacency on the experience of decades of discrimination during which no serious crisis in inter-ethnic relations has occurred. To those people it must be said that the majority leaders in Ireland, Canada, and Pakistan believed for decades that "it wouldn't happen there." When the conditions were ripe and the conflict broke out, it was no longer possible to restrain it.

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CSO: 4805

EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF MISSING IMAM MUSA AL-SADR

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 7 Aug 79 p 4

[Article: "Conference on al-Sadr Was Not Held; Libyan Representative Did Not Attend and Iranian Representative Expected Postponement Until September"]

[Text] The efforts by several sides to convene an international conference in Paris to investigate the disappearance of the head of the Supreme Shiite Islamic Council, Imam Musa al-Sadr, have not been successful despite the fact that a high-level representative of Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeyni and the Iranian Government, Dr Khadimi, arrived in the French capital several days ago to attend the conference along with the new Iranian ambassador in Paris, (Amir 'Alai).

A delegation from the Supreme Shiite Islamic Council and the "Amal" movement, headed by Muhammad (Sha'ito), secretary-general of the Shiite Council, and Dr Husayn (Kan'an), a Member of the "Amal" movement, arrived in the French capital 3 days ago.

A prominent source in the Shiite Council told AL-NAHAR in Beirut that the meeting had been set for 1600 yesterday at the Iranian embassy. However, it was not held because of the absence of the Libyan side, although all the other parties expressed their readiness to participate.

The spokesman for the Shiite delegation and the "Amal" movement, Dr Husayn (Kan'an), contacted AL-NAHAR from Paris and gave the following statement: "The conference was not held because of Libya's refusal to attend. This position condemns Libya before the Islamic world and the world at large, especially after conclusive evidence has established that Imam al-Sadr, who was an invited guest of the Libyan Government, was detained without justification. This act constitutes a violation of Islamic principles and an attack on the inviolability of men of religion, aside from violating Arab traditions of hospitality and the most basic principles of international relations."

He added: "The Libyan position on this conference will have an effect on continuing Libyan efforts, which began with Libyan Prime Minister Maj 'Abd-al-Salam Jalud's visit to Tehran last April, to establish diplomatic relations with the Islamic republic in Iran."

What happened in the French capital during the hours prior to the opening of the conference?

It has been learned from informed sources in the Shiite Council and the "Amal" movement and from contacts with members of the Shiite delegation in Paris that the Iranian ambassador in Paris contacted the Libyan ambassador yesterday urging him to attend the conference, but the Libyan ambassador gave the excuse that he was undergoing medical examinations and did not know when they would be finished.

At that time it was decided not to hold the meeting since the main party concerned in the matter was Libya.

Those who were slated to attend the ambassador-level meeting were Iran, Algeria, Libya, Lebanon, Syria, Italy and the PLO, in addition to representatives of the Shiite Council and the "Amal" movement.

AL-NAHAR also learned that the Lebanese Foreign Ministry provided the charge d'affaires of the Lebanese Embassy in Paris, Mr (Qarnafal), with dossiers on the al-Sadr affair.

AL-NAHAR's correspondent in Paris, Basharah al-Bun, sent a report on the conference and the events surrounding it up to the announcement that the conference had not been held. He reported: "The news of the conference was enshrouded in a cloud of contradictory conjectures which ranged from absolute refusal to postponement to confirmation."

The Iranian Embassy in Paris indicated to AL-NAHAR that the conference was postponed to a later date on the pretext that August is both a vacation month and the month of Ramadan. He hastened to assert, however, that the idea is still alive, and the conference will probably be rescheduled for September.

Syrian Embassy sources said that the idea of the conference is an old one which came in the wake of a message sent by the new Iranian ambassador in Paris to several embassies, including the Syrian Embassy, and nothing new was developed since that time. The embassy denied knowing the time and place of the meeting yesterday.

As for Italy, the charge d'affaires of its embassy in Paris, Mr Umberto (Tofano), told AL-NAHAR that the ambassador is currently on vacation and the Italian Government has not sent any instructions on this matter. He categorically denied knowing about the conference and asserted that he did not receive any invitation to attend it but learned about it from the

news agencies. He described this story as a "strange affair," and concluded by asserting that news reports which the Libyan Government voluntarily undertook to publish to the effect that the disappearance of Imam al-Sadr occurred in Italy "are contrary to the facts and devoid of truth."

AL-NAHAR has learned that the two members of the Shiite delegation, (Sha'ito) and (Kan'an), will travel from Paris to another European capital to discuss the Al-Sadr affair.

8591

CSO: 4802

AHMAD AL-KHATIB STATEMENT CRITICIZES ARMY COMMAND

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 1 Aug 79 p 3

[Article: "Ahmad al-Khatib at a Press Conference: Army Command Still Sectarian and Has Taken the Meaning Out of the Defense Law"]

[Text] The commander of the Lebanese Arab Army, Ahmad al-Khatib, said that the new defense law enshrines the sectarianism of the army command and that the army command has taken the meaning out of the law's regulatory statutes by sending officers from a specific sectarian majority to specialized staff courses.

Al-Khatib announced that the army command "is still dealing with Sa'd Haddad" and presented a "document" which he said proves that such dealings are taken place. He indicated that "the command of Victor Khuri has attached a number of troops to Haddad's militias." Al-Khatib spoke yesterday at a press conference which he called at his headquarters in Mahallah al-Bastah.

Al-Khatib also presented two service memoranda issued from Al-Yarzah. The first was No 837/m.' of 28 April 1979 (file) 120/1 demarcating the border strip area, and the second was No 4532/m.a. (attachment) 300/1 stipulating the retention of reserve troops in the service for 1 year.

He said that all these troops were from a specific sect, and that in accordance with this memorandum the so-called "concentrations of the south" were established. The secretariat of these concentrations was assigned to Khalil 'Awn.

He named the following troops as among those attached to Sa'd Haddad in accordance with this memorandum: Khayrallah al-Fahilah, promoted to the rank of lieutenant and the (Dabin) elements numbering 22 troops including two first sergeants, 'Ali 'Isa and 'Abd-al-Karim Taraf.

He said that all of these troops were placed at Haddad's disposal according to instructions issued by the command, which continues to pay their salaries.



Al-Khatib also referred to service memorandum No 3680/'d.t. of 25 April 1979 abolishing combat group 1, which had been commanded by officer Al-Tahhan. This group was reestablished on 1 June 1979. Its strength was increased to battalion level and the same officer was reassigned to command it.

Al-Khatib's statement also referred to "memorandum of the martyrs No 33/s of 12 August 1978," he said that this memorandum included the names of Sergeant First Class 'Isa 'Abud, who "died an immoral death," and police sergeant Wajih Zaytun, who "was killed while committing the crime of theft on the Kata'ib's barricade in al-Dawrah."

Al-Khatib went on to speak of the plan to rearm the Lebanese Army, commenting: "It is being prepared with the aim of suppression and not defense against the Israeli enemy, because the armored weapons with which the army is being equipped are light weapons appropriate for police work. This indicates that the army command does not intend to fight Israel."

He expressed wonder about why the command does not procure weapons to counter aircraft and rockets, and where the wasted money has gone.

Finally, Al-Khatib referred to the arbitrariness, suppression, exemplary punishment, castigation and debasement to which the men of the Lebanese Arab Army have been subjected at the hands of the Al-Yarzah command, which is encouraged to continue such actions by its wager that the nationalist faction will not speak out against these practices."

He said that the official in charge of the army's spiritual guidance, Milad 'Assaf, is also an announcer for Kata'ib's Voice of Lebanon broadcast.

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## REORGANIZATION SAID SHIFT TO RULE OF THE PEOPLE

Tripoli AL-USBU' AL-SIYASI in Arabic 13 Jul 79 p 11

[Article by 'Umar al-Najim Dizah: "What Does Disappearance of Secretariat of Interior Mean?"]

[Text] Numerous facts and laws seem simple for the first instance and many dangers and difficult and impossible issues seem simple and easy to a passing look. Our interpretation of numerous decisions does not go beyond describing them as ordinary and administrative decisions because we pay no attention to their essence and because we often fail to comprehend the philosophy that brought them into existence and the goals that we will realize.

I believe that a pause is required to examine and study the merging of the powers of the Secretariat of Interior with those of the Secretariat of Justice--a merger which has come about as a result of a popular resolution in accordance with which some secretariats have been merged, some organizations have been abolished and other organizations or secretariats have been introduced. I say that this decision is significant and serious because the Ministry--Secretariat--of Interior is acknowledged as one of the main authorities in all parts of the world. In the Third World countries in particular, the task of this ministry has been connected with safeguarding the regime in existence. This is why the agencies, instruments, methods and arts of this ministry have been diversified and have assumed predominantly the quality of oppression and terrorization in order to safeguard the existing instrument of government.

In the days of the defunct regime, the Ministry of Interior represented an instrument of persecution and oppression because its task was to protect the mainstays of that regime by various means and methods, through foiling all movements yearning for freedom and through suppressing all forms of self-expression and wrath opposed to the king. The strength of the monarchic regime's interest in this ministry reached the degree whereby its personnel were equipped with various kinds of weapons, beginning with clubs and ending with bullets, hand grenades and armored cars which were not available at the time even to our armed forces. The mobile force, one of the agencies controlled by this ministry at the time, became well-known for its violence,

strength, rigidity, its strong loyalty to the ruling regime, its strong hatred for the people and its readiness and devotion to act and move according to this definite method.

Even though after the inception of the great 1 September revolution the powers of this ministry were defined and changed by the degree compatible with the revolution's aspirations, the ministry continued to exist until the day when the Revolution Command Council ended as an instrument of government with the power to issue decisions and was replaced by the people's authority which took over the power of issuing the decision and of watching its implementation. Then came another day in which the powers of the Secretariat of Interior--the military secretariat entrusted with military discipline and with definite orders--were merged with those of the Secretariat of Justice, which is a civilian secretariat, and new powers were entrusted to this Secretariat of Justice. The word "interior" has disappeared and a people's committee has been formed to run this facility.

Why are the powers of the Secretariat of Interior merged with those of the Secretariat of Justice?

Why does the name of the Secretariat of Interior disappear from among the names of the other secretariats?

What is the philosophy behind merging a secretariat with a military character with another secretariat having a civilian character?

What is the purpose of creating people's committees in this new secretariat?

What is understood from this?

How is this serious action to be interpreted?

What, particularly, is the citizen's role?

What is the duty of the specialized people's justice committees in connection with this transformation?

What are the expected results?

The issue is not easy. The police stations no longer receive their instructions from the security controller or from the governor. The security control committees no longer wait to receive instructions from the minister of interior but from the specialized people's justice committees which are now responsible for the police centers and stations in their respective municipalities. The Jamahiriyah's General People's Justice Committee is now responsible for the various police agencies.

The issue is not easy because it means a lot, a whole lot. It means that the country's authority is a people's authority as a result of the absence of all forms of inherited traditional government existing in the world. The

sole purpose of the existence of police forces is to safeguard these forms. The issue also means that the authority is no longer in the hands of a party, a council, an individual or a tribe. Man no longer looks forward to the creation of a republic with its conventional ministries as much as he aspires to the age of the masses with its people's congresses and committees so that he may get control of the authority, of the resources and of the weapons and so that with the passage of time all the conventional agencies, bureaus and instruments whose tasks have been tied to issuing self-serving decisions or to personal gains may disappear automatically and may not act in a manner conflicting with the people's authority.

This issue means that a big step has been taken to underline the people's authority that stresses the need to break all forms of monopoly, including the weapons monopoly. This step constitutes the beginning of the end of the policeman's exclusive possession of arms and of certain powers. The responsibility of bearing arms is no longer confined to the policeman or the soldier alone but has become the responsibility of all the citizens. The policeman is no longer the only person responsible for pursuing criminals and uncovering crime. This has become the responsibility of all the people. All this ridicules the principle of deputization and representation because it is unreasonable that a policeman should pursue criminals while the citizen takes the position of a spectator as if the matter does not concern him at all because he is not a policeman.

Even the process of issuing orders and instructions is no longer complicated and does not follow the pattern whereby such orders and instructions are issued from one officer to another and so on. They are now issued by a civilian people's committee. This makes it possible to eliminate the military quality of this agency so that it may become in the future more like a scout movement.

The citizen has the responsibility of ridding himself of the old complexes, myths and illusions that are embedded deep in his mind. These complexes still make the citizen see in today's policeman the face of the past policeman who used to jail, beat and suppress. The citizen should not fear or be intimidated by the policeman, but should respect him, because the policeman is an ordinary citizen who needs help to perform his duty, like any other citizen. The citizen should not feel apprehensive of policemen, especially since the work and duties with which the police may be entrusted to take certain precautions or to carry out certain action are not the same as the work and duties with which the policemen and the mobile force of the defunct regime used to be entrusted.

The specialized people's committees, which are in charge of and which supervise the police in the age of the masses, must also rid themselves of the aforementioned complexes and must understand the role which we expect the police to perform in the future. This is a role according to which the ghost of the policeman carrying a club and a gun will be eliminated from our minds and replaced by that of a policeman carrying a pen and paper. It is a role according to which the negative image of the policeman with his blood-red uniform and his bullets is removed forever and replaced by the positive image of the policeman of the age of the masses who offers all kinds of services and helps when any problem crops up in your way.

Finally, I ask: Will the citizen rise to the level of the role awaiting him? Will the special people's justice committees supervise this agency well?

## REJECTIONIST STATES OIL SAID USEFUL WEAPON AGAINST CAPITALIST SYSTEM

Tripoli AL-USBU' AL-SIYASI in Arabic 20 Jul 79 pp 14-15

[Article: "What Can Oil Weapon Do to Our Enemies?"]

[Text] The revolution leader has once again brought up the oil weapon and its role in the Arab liberation battle. The question strongly projecting itself now is: Does the Arab liberation movement possess enough to make up for the catastrophe caused by al-Sadat's regime through the departure of Egypt with all its human and material resources from the Arab liberation movement and can this movement confront the imperialist-Zionist onslaught and achieve victory?

We say yes.

The Arab nation possesses the strength of its peoples, including the Egyptian people--a strength which constitutes an arsenal of hydrogen [bombs] that has not been used in our struggle against imperialism and Zionism.

We also possess the oil weapon, which is the subject of this article.

Let us first discuss the importance of the Arab oil before we discuss the possibilities of its use and before we discuss the issues raised around it.

#### Importance of Arab Oil to International Capitalist Economy:

The importance of the Arab oil to the international capitalist economy arises from the four following facts:

First, the international capitalist economy depends for operating its production and war machine on nearly 92.8 million barrels of oil daily, or the equivalent of 5,000 million [sic] tons of oil from the various sources of energy (excluding the socialist countries).

Second, it [presumably Arab oil] constituted 51.6 percent of the energy consumed by the world in 1977.

It is worth noting that the capitalist world's current consumption of oil amounts to 47.3 million barrels daily, of which the Western industrial countries (United States, Western Europe, Japan and Canada) consume 38.3 million barrels daily. It seems that it is impossible to find an alternative to replace oil in a significant quantity within a period of two decades. This means that the international capitalist economy will remain firmly tied to oil till the end of the century.

Third, oil production in the Western industrial countries is not enough to meet their consumption of this commodity. These countries import nearly 25 million barrels of oil and oil derivatives daily. Of these imports, 8 million barrels go to the United States, and they represent 45 percent of its total oil consumption; 12 million barrels go to West Europe and represent 85.5 percent of its total oil consumption, and 6 million barrels go to Japan and represent nearly 100 percent of its consumption.

Fourth, the Arab countries supply nearly 19 million barrels [daily] to the international capitalist market, of which 12.8 million barrels daily go to the aforementioned Western industrial countries. This means that Arab oil supplies the Western industrial countries with nearly 51 percent of their needs of this strategic commodity. The 12.8 million barrel exports to the West (the Western industrial countries) are divided as follows:

A total of 7.2 million barrels daily to the West European industrial countries representing 58 percent of their oil imports, 3.1 million barrels daily to the United States representing 38 percent of its total oil imports and 2.52 million barrels daily for Japan representing 48 percent of its total oil imports.

It is (certain), according to the currently available information on the outcome of oil discoveries, that the relative importance of Arab oil will continue to rise for the next 5 year at least.

Arab oil will not be threatened in the future except by the conclusion of vast oil agreements [sic] outside the Arab area covering a period of more than one decade and except by [a shift] toward alternative energy sources, especially the nuclear source, which represented 3 percent of the energy consumed in the Western industrial countries in 1987 [presumably 1978]. But the growth of the nuclear source will face rising opposition from the public opinion of the advanced industrial countries, especially after the recent incident in the nuclear plant in Pennsylvania, the United States. This means that the Arab oil will continue to be the source for meeting more than 50 percent of the needs of the Western capitalist countries through the 1980's at least. Regardless of the degree by which the Western industrial countries curtail the increase in energy and oil consumption, they will only, at best, be able to maintain their present degree of reliance on imported oil, mainly Arab oil. We should keep in mind, however, that the policy of reduced consumption cannot be pursued too far without leading to negative effects on employment and to subsequent turmoil and ruptures in the capitalist system, If we assume that it is



possible to completely cut off Arab oil supplies to the capitalist industrial countries, then there is no doubt that the result will be the destruction of their economies in a very short time through the consequences created by the cutoff of 51 percent of the total oil supplies of these countries. At the outset of such a cutoff, energy prices will rise to unprecedented and astronomical levels and will produce all kinds of problems.

#### Oil Sources Cannot Be Occupied

[These problems] will be connected with upsetting the industrial countries' balances of payment and this will result in waves of rampant inflation coupled at the same time with unprecedented stagnation in the capitalist system. The waves of stagnation will lead to increased unemployment and to social turmoil that will hasten the downfall of the capitalist system.

This is why it is not surprising that we hear about Western plans--especially U.S. plans--for military intervention in the Middle East or in the Arab homeland if all or some of the Arab countries take the step of cutting off their oil supplies to the capitalist industrial countries. We will see later on how the danger of the oil supplied by only a few Arab countries is enough to deal a grave blow to the international capitalist system. Consequently, using this oil as a political weapon is enough to deter the United States and West Europe and enough, consequently, to deter and liquidate the Zionist aggression.

The central issue does not lie in discussing the possibility of occupation of the oil sources by imperialism. We cannot imagine easily that the industrial countries will embark on occupying the oil sources in all the Arab countries or in the three countries of the Rejectionist Front. No armed struggle can take place in the oil sources, especially if they are fortified intelligently, because they are easily inflammable areas. Iran's example at the end of last year and the beginning of this year (the complete stoppage of oil production and exportation) confirms that military intervention for the occupation of oil sources is not an easy thing. Moreover, such a possibility will lead to a comprehensive confrontation with most of the Arab countries, not to mention its subsequent impact on the relations of the world powers.

The real question regarding the issue of using the oil weapon lies not in the possibility or impossibility of military intervention but in whether the Arab countries want or can use the oil weapon.

This important question is constantly avoided because answering it inevitably calls for discussing the desire of the Arab oil countries to fight and destroy the international capitalist system which created Israel and which supports it and protects its existence. We have two initial remarks:

First, we do not want to use oil as a political weapon in the manner in which it was used during the October 1973 war when production was reduced by only 5 percent monthly and when oil was embargoed to certain countries



for no more than 3 months, during which oil flowed from one capitalist country to another. Moreover, the trivial drop in monthly production allowed the non-Arab countries to raise their production by high percentages to make up for the small shortage created by some Arab countries (Iran's production was raised by 100 percent during the embargo and the period of reduced production). The fact is that the benefits reaped by the United States and by the multi-national oil companies, which are controlled by U.S. companies, exceeded by far the benefits reaped by the Arabs as a result of this lane embargo. The United States and these companies were able to create the right atmosphere--the international crisis--to accuse the Arabs of tampering with the capitalist economic system. They were also able to create the right atmosphere--a crisis--to raise the oil prices to \$21.651 per barrel. We should keep in mind that the OPEC countries had set their revenues at \$7 per barrel. The United States and the multi-national companies were thus able to impose the new energy strategy--a strategy which President Nixon had tried since 1970 to implement in successive and well-studied phases. This is the first observation.

Second Observation: Before we discuss the degree of the ability of all the Arab countries to use the oil weapon, we must first explain the effectiveness of the oil weapon available to the rejectionist states, namely the Jamahiriyah and Algeria which are members of the Rejectionist Front, in addition to Iraq.

#### Strength of Rejectionist Oil Countries

The oil exports of these countries amount to nearly 5.8 million barrels daily, of which 1.3 million barrels daily go to the United States (representing 16 percent of the total U.S. oil imports), 2.4 million barrels daily to the major West European industrial countries (representing 24 percent of their oil imports) and 180,000 barrels daily go to Japan (representing 3 percent of its oil imports). These quantities may not seem very effective. But when we imagine that there are enormous possibilities for cooperation with Iran, which currently adopts the policy of not expanding its exports, then the international capitalist market can be denied nearly 8 million barrels of oil daily (4 million daily from the three Arab countries and 4 million daily from Iran). Reducing oil supplies by this quantity will result in a fatal blow to the international capitalist system. The oil fields of Saudi Arabia and of the entire Gulf and those outside both will not be able to make up one half this shortfall in less than 2 years. It is worth noting that when the Iranian oil (6 million barrels daily) was cut off in January and February and until 5 March 1979, the Saudi fields and others were not able to supply more than 3 million barrels daily, and there continued to be a shortfall of 3 million barrels daily. As a result of that shortfall, oil prices (a commodity in demand) rose to \$26-\$27 per barrel or twice the official OPEC price per barrel.

Reducing the oil supply by 8 million barrels (constituting a part of the Rejectionist Front and Iranian oil) daily will raise the international oil prices to nearly \$30-\$35 per barrel at least. This price, in addition to

the shortfall of supply by 8 million barrels daily, will lead to grave consequences for the Western capitalist economies, will bring about the immediate collapse of some of them and will increase the problems of the U.S. economy (deficit in the balance of payments, the collapse of the value of the dollar and the drop in the value of the economic production).

It is most likely that doubling the current oil prices (up to the level of \$30-\$35 per barrel) will at least deepen the subsidiary conflicts between the United States on the one hand and its European and Japanese allies on the other.

We use [presumably will be using] this weapon to defend our national interests and to retaliate for the aggressive policy of the leader of imperialism and for its collusion with Zionism.

#### Small Sacrifices

The financial sacrifices to be shouldered by the oil countries of the Rejectionist Front as a result of their adoption of this policy will not be large. These three countries (Iraq, Libya and Algeria) earned nearly \$31 billion from the exportation of 5.8 million barrels daily (at a price of \$13-\$14 per barrel). These countries can earn \$20-\$25 billion from the exportation of 1.8 million barrels daily at a price of \$30-\$35 per barrel at least. There is no doubt that this is a small sacrifice of luxury that must be accepted in return for channeling the national action in the right direction of liquidating the Zionist-imperialist aggression against the Arab nation. Naturally, the Rejectionist Front countries will reap economically, and at the oil level the important benefit of preserving their oil resources for a long time.

After the tour of the revolution leader, it seems that there are, according to the statements of the [Arab] rulers, possibilities for cooperation and for confronting the imperialist onslaught and al-Sadat's treason on the part of the rejectionist countries and of the other Arab countries that committed themselves to the Baghdad summit resolutions and that have reaffirmed these resolutions in official statements. So, do these countries possess the national courage to use the oil weapon, even if only once, in the battle of the Arab existence?

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## CITIZENS URGED TO BUY THEIR GOODS FROM PEOPLE'S MARKETS

Tripoli AL-MUNTIJUN in Arabic 7 Jul 79 p 16

[Article: "What Is Required Is To Foil Opportunity for Manipulators"]

[Text] Once again we return to talk about the need for the masses to frequent the people's markets which, though available in limited numbers, have enough consumer goods to meet the citizen's needs. However, the citizen still prefers to deal with the ensnaring shops, most of which--we are now certain--are engaged in an intentional, exposed and condemned act of obstruction. The owners of these shops resort to emptying [presumably hoarding] the goods in their shops in a manner that makes the request for "a thing" always coupled with the answer: It is not available. However, the fact is that the commodities are present and available if the citizen seeks the right shop. These goods will also become inevitably available at the shops of those greedy merchants who have become accustomed to repeating the words: By God the Triumphant, it is not available. If these merchants proceeded with clear and sincere intentions, they would be able to bring the merchandise to their shops.

We published a short report [on this issue] in the previous edition and on the same day, the sisterly AL-FAJR AL-JADID emerged with a report containing pictures and figures on the sums allocated for the construction of new people's market complexes in which the citizen will be able to find everything from a needle to gold, as they say.

Our masses, especially the masses in the production bases, are now required to display greater and greater demand by purchasing their needs of consumer goods from the already existing people's popular markets and from the various types of consumer cooperatives.

Our call to our producing brothers and to others to frequent such shops emanates from the fact that we, and they, are approaching the great month of fasting or, as it is said, the month in which man craves things. The requirements for this month are available as of this moment. Very regrettably, we have all noticed that these requirements have begun to disappear from the "ensnaring shops" for a reason that the shop owners know--rather for an

obvious reason that is condemned religiously, ethically, legally and revolutionarily, namely greed--so that they may sell the hoarded goods at higher prices with the onset of the month of Ramadan.

We do not want to seek the help of the authorities concerned to investigate and interrogate. We all sincerely wish that the zealous citizens will teach those who tamper with their food a hard lesson by boycotting them, by refraining from buying their goods and by proceeding immediately to the popular markets. We also ask the people in charge of these markets to devote additional time to provide their services to their brother citizens and to foil the opportunity for the manipulators.

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SAUDI STRENGTH, PROBLEMS DISCUSSED

Domestic, Political, Economic Problems

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 20 Aug 79 pp 108-121

Text Saudi Arabia used to consider itself a major power--the paternally ruled but internally disintegrating country controlled economies and governments by deploying oil and money. At present, though, the pillars of Saudi power are tottering: Unnoticed by the world at large, oil wells have blown up. The Saudi princes are just as unable to buy security for money as was the Shah. A collapse of the Saudi Arabian bastion would have disastrous consequences for the Western industrial nations.

A blood red flash lit up the sky, shooting upward like a giant arrow. A few seconds later a powerful blast shook the village of Abqaiq, south of Dhahran, the Saudi Arabian port on the Persian Gulf.

The main pipeline, leading from the oilfields near Abqaiq to the piers on the Gulf, was destroyed. Widely visible, an inferno of flames surrounded the leak.

This was not the usual "blow out"--the term used by the experts for those accidental explosions which, despite all precautions, occur in all oil fields. It was sabotage, and it was not even the first such instance in Saudi Arabia nor the first in Abqaiq. More than a year ago a borehole had been exploded there.

In February last the pipeline near Ras Tanura was blown up. The flow of oil to the tankers berthed at the piers dried up abruptly. Shortly afterward Aramco engineers reported an attack near Hofuf, an oasis in the oil field region between the Saudi capital Riyadh and the Gulf.

The world learned nothing of these attacks, but for the Saudi princes in their air conditioned palaces in Jiddah and Riyadh these were traumatic events: The oil wells, the vital nerve strands of their power, endangered by an untraceable foe.

The rulers from the desert tyrannized the world for years, entirely as they pleased and apparently inviolate. One nod of their heads allowed entire industries to blossom; a frown from under a white headdress signified an end to the growth of economies and industries.

Who was going to remonstrate with a country which exports more oil than any other; who was willing to make an enemy of the desert rulers whose only concern is how to spend their money, not how to get hold of some?

Saudi Arabia does have money--a country with an area a third that of the United States but populated by only 3-4 million people--as much money as any major power. The foreign exchange reserves alone amount to some \$20 billion.

Until now the Saudis have been able to settle everything with money. They distributed their largesse everywhere, kept Palestinians and South Yemenis at arm's length and, as reported by usually well informed sources, even offered Fidel Castro a lot of money should the Cuban leader decide to turn his back on the Soviets. Money, so ran the Saudi creed, meant security, influence, power and wealth.

And now this--attacks on the oil and no chance of buying themselves out of trouble. Fear stalked the palaces in the desert. Whom had they forgotten to bribe?

The attackers professed to be the men of the "Liberation Front of the Arab Peninsula," a group of militant enemies of the Saudi monarchy. Radio Baghdad gleefully reported the attacks because Iraq aids the partisans of the Liberation Front. In the stony deserts of the virtually empty country the partisans can move around at will.

The Saudis are making every effort to keep up the appearance of unconcern and at least to hush up the attacks--in fact, though, the shock was profound. These are the real reasons for the surprising about-turn of the former U.S. friends in Saudi Arabia and their accession to the camp of the radical Arabs who reject the Egyptian-Israeli separate peace: In danger are not only the oil wells which alone secure the country's wealth and political influence, directly threatened also are the lives of the Saudi rulers.

This presages a development which might have disastrous consequences for the West. From the economic as well as the security aspect the West was able somehow to cope with the collapse of the Western bastion Iran, its Shah and its oil, especially immediately after the event, because the Saudis raised their oil production and Egypt's Sadat consistently upheld the U.S. line.



A Saudi breakaway on the Iranian model would change the entire situation to the detriment of the West and make American intervention in the Mideast virtually inevitable.

Certainly there are obvious differences between the Shah's Iran and King Khalid's Saudi Arabia: In Iran an autocracy, supported primarily by the secret police and the army, incurred the hatred of the popular masses who did not share in the oil bonanza and suffered from the technocratic modernism of the ruler--with the result that in the end a religious fanatic easily gained the upper hand.

In Saudi Arabia, nearly devoid of people, there are no such urban masses; there is no chasm between the religious and the political leadership of the country; the population quite definitely shares in the blessings of the oil wealth.

And yet this same Saudi Arabia, arbiter of the fate of the West, has feet of clay; its leadership stratum is profoundly insecure, and the political future of the country seems uncertain. Comparable to Iran in this respect, in its infatuation with oil the leadership of Islam managed to destabilize its own base--and this was precisely the base which once supported the Saudis self-esteem and morality.

The royal family has already had a foretaste of that which might happen in Saudi Arabia. On behalf of the Arab rejection front, Iraqi President Saddam Husayn openly threatened: 'We will take the fight right into the princes bedrooms.'

That this threat must be taken literally was something the princes learned no later than the Arab League Conference in the Somali capital Mogadishu, immediately before the Egyptian-Israeli accord.

The Somalis had accommodated their Arab guests in separate bungalows within a hotel complex. A senior Somali official reported: 'We had the greatest difficulty in keeping the Palestinian delegation from assaulting the Saudis. Eventually we had to use force to take the Palestinians weapons away from them.'

The climate for pressure on the Saudis (initially still inclined to moderation) was far more favorable in the so-called Peace Palace of Baghdad, where the League met after the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement. Iraqi Foreign Minister Sa'dun Hammadi threatened: 'We have the resources for punishing all those who collaborate with Sadat's traitorous regime.'

When Saudi Foreign Minister Sa'ud ibn Faysal Al Sa'ud nevertheless objected to the sanctions which Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, South Yemen and the PLO wished to impose on Egypt, the rejectionist front began to apply the thumb-screws.

The PLO had already announced that a Palestinian special commando would return the Shah to Iran--dead or alive--as if it were a matter of course so to treat Islamic rulers.

Overnight South Yemeni forces advanced 70 km into the territory of the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) and threatened this buffer state universally known to be under the influence of Saudi Arabia.

This move came as a total surprise to the Saudis. For several years past, by extending loans running into the millions and establishing diplomatic relations, they had been able to prevent communist South Yemen from making a move in the north. Aden even exiled the Dhofar Liberation Front which had intended to topple Sultan Qabus Ibn Sa'id al Bu Sa'id, a tried and tested Saudi ally.

It was surely not accidental that Moscow's PRAVDA reported at the time of the South Yemen incursion into North Yemen that the anti-Saudi leader of the Oman Liberation Front--totally inactive for months--had been received in audience by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Flanked by enemies in south and north, the Saudis suddenly awoke to their impotence: Despite spending billions they were just as unable to buy security for their rule as had been the Shah of Iran. "We were chasing a beautiful pipedream," confessed a Saudi spokesman to the Arab League, "the dream has ended."

Gone are the days when a command from the desert capital Riyadh inspired panic in the Mideast.

The Islamic heartland with the holy cities Mecca and Medina helped finance the expensive Lebanon adventure of socialist Syria, aided Muslim movements around the globe.

Checks from Saudi Arabia brought about the break between Moscow and Somalia. Moderate Palestinians in Saudi pay protected the Egyptian Embassy in Beirut, threatened by leftist Palestinians.

The wealthy emirs did not even make sure that their shower of dollars always descended on suitable recipients. "The Saudi Arabians sent monthly checks even to our Marxist rivals," complained Osman Salih Sab'be, chief of the Islamic Liberation Front of Eritrea, in a talk with SPIEGEL.

Fully conscious of their powers the oil princes venture upon actions which have no relation at all to the actual political significance and strategic potential of their country. For 2 years they kept forces in Jordan and even participated in the "Arab Peace Force" in civil war torn Lebanon.

However, Saudi soldiers there devoted themselves to voluptuous Lebanese women and strong drink to an extent which made the moralistic speeches from home appear somewhat ridiculous. Riyadh withdrew its forces from Beirut in

February last. To maintain the morale of the Saudi campaigners, the returnees from sinful Beirut were sent to the deepest south of Arabia, where they are to be made to return to the principles enunciated by the Prophet.

Nor can the Saudi princes rely on the loyalty of the officer corps. In January last Muhammad Ahmed Suwayli, commander of the Haradh garrison, rebelled; 37 soldiers joined him. To the amazement of many Saudis Suwayli is said to have rejected an order to fire on striking foreign workers.

As they do in foreign affairs, the Saudis try at home also to resolve all problems by throwing money at them. Money has become the spiritual focus of Saudi life; it is lying, literally heaped high, on the counters of the money changers in the suks of Jiddah and Riyadh.

In huge wooden drawers the hard currencies of the world jostle one another: D-marks, dollars, Swiss francs--and of course Saudi riyals. Customers surge around, laughing and gesticulating wildly, their fists full of thousands.

The broker contemptuously accepts the hundreds offered him for exchange by West German visitors. He quickly counts off the bills, they then fly on top of the brown-blueish D-mark mountain, consisting of thousands and hundreds.

Without even looking, he reaches for the riyal mountain and peels off the equivalent amount. Hurry, hurry, how is next?

Money is something the Saudis strew around with all the arrogance of the newly rich. The following is a typical occurrence in a TV store, where a Saudi customer asks: "How much are the color sets here?" The clerk quotes the prices: 1,500, 2,000, 3,500 riyals.

"Don't you have any set which is more expensive?" the customer wants to know. The clerk says no. "Very well, in that case I'll take the 3,500 riyal set."

Evidently the bazaars of Riyadh and Jiddah are tailored to the needs of such well-to-do customers. Rarely found in these stores are cheap plastic containers, glitter and junk, such as predominate in the bazaar districts of other Mideast countries. The tone is set by stores bulging with the products of modern entertainment electronics, ostentatious windows of sinfully expensive jewelry stores where showpieces such as diamond studded gold watches are among those items which are casually picked up by the passer-by.

Money does not seem to be a problem anywhere; or at least the government does its best to make its citizens think so. If someone wants to build, for example, the government provides a loan amounting to some 70 percent of construction costs--however great. As a rule would-be Saudi builders get the site as an additional bonus. Interest and principal repayments legally begin only after 10 years.

In fact, however, the government forgives repayment of the loan once the building is completed. It stands to reason that, in these circumstances, the Saudis' pleasure in construction has no limits whatsoever.

The entire country looks like a giant construction site. Often buildings with the most modern technical equipment are erected in the middle of the desert where a network of asphalted roads provides a framework for cities growing within it at a rate fast enough to take one's breath away.

Yield is something to which the Saudis do not need to pay any attention: In Taif, for example, in the Hejaz mountains, a palatial hotel was built right on top of a rock, glittering with glass and marble. All the delights of French haute cuisine are available, but guests are rare.

At most a few sheikhs from the neighboring village visit the parquet floored and mirrored restaurant for dinner by candlelight. The waiters, immaculately outfitted, far outnumber the diners. As a Western expert on Saudi Arabia commented, "never mind the cost; they can afford it, so they do it."

The princes in Riyadh believe that everything may be achieved with money, even to the extent of making settlers of the Bedouins. At the moment these dwellers in the desert still move across the country (as in the days of Muhammad), accompanied by their herds of camels and sheep--and withstand the temptations of the money society.

None of the government's efforts to settle them has had the slightest success. The government hands every Bedouin who forsakes migration a gift of money and a brand new American luxury car. Many Bedouins accept the gifts and yet remain faithful to their traditional lifestyle. As a result the desert is littered with air conditioned Buicks and Pontiacs, equipped with electric windows, and standing in front of shabby Bedouin tents.

According to Bedouin Sa'id ibn Abd el-Aziz: "I much prefer a camel to this car and, as Allah is my witness, my tent is a hundred times better than any house."

They simply cannot stand living in the houses provided cost-free by the government. Even if a Bedouin decides to settle down, he wants at least to sleep in the open. The wall around the yard is far more important than the house itself, and walls are built in Bedouin settlements before the actual house is completed.

However much the Bedouin may be wooed, the blessings of the money society do not apply to some other sections of the population; most notably to women and former slaves.

Women are still considered the chattel of their menfolk and may not appear in public other than wrapped in black veils. In the train from Riyadh to Dhahran on the Persian Gulf husbands search for the most remote place, sit

their wives in a corner, heap luggage in front of them to obscure the view, and then place themselves at the other end of the row of seats.

Once the Saudi traveler feels secure, he goes to have tea in the dining car. The wife, hidden as well as possible, may not move from her allotted spot.

Woe betide the women who, thrown out by their husbands, do not find shelter with their kin. They do not have the slightest chance of getting a job, even if they are suitably trained.

The former slaves of the desert kingdom are hardly better off. True, when slavery was officially abolished 17 years ago they obtained Saudi citizenship. Yet they remained second class citizens: Nubians, Nigerians and Ethiopians. Only a few of them succeeded in rising on the social ladder. Many crept away to slum settlements, somewhere along the overland routes--including some hundreds of former slaves from Nigeria, who settled 75 km east of Jiddah.

There they lived unmolested until October last, when soldiers turned up in the slave village and brusquely ordered the residents to leave--the site was needed for a new road.

Normally a Saudi Arabian thanks Allah on his knees if he owns a piece of land needed by the government for a road, because compensation is generous. Even in Saudi terms many people have gotten rich by such a sale. In the case of the former slaves, though, the Saudi authorities considered compensation unnecessary. Subsequently the tall and brawny Nigerians made trouble. Without much effort they managed to beat up the slight Bedouin soldiers, badly enough to send them to hospital.

The latter returned by helicopter. From the air they fired on everything that moved. When they had finished, 30 former slaves lay dead, 120 were seriously injured. The survivors were taken prisoner, the Saudi passports of all victims destroyed.

Later the Saudi newspaper OKAS was able to report to its readers that a lesson had been taught "foreign elements" who had "resisted a check on their identity." That responds to the traditional interpretation. According to Saudi concepts, no more than a slave mentality should be expected of foreigners who flocked to the country from many parts simply for the sake of money.

This opinion is evident when, for example, Saudi firms use newspaper advertisements to search for foreign workers who left the country before finishing their contracts. Such advertisements, spread over several pages of the newspapers every day, read like warrants for escaped slaves. For instance:

"The El-Madar Engineering Company, Reg No 2203, announces that it permitted its employee Asad Abdu Sak'r to take a leave in Lebanon. This has now expired, but Sak'r has not returned to his job.



The firm warns others not to employ him and asks anybody who knows that Sak'r has returned to the kingdom to call the firm, telephone 3 58 54, or notify the nearest police precinct."

Just as foreigners may leave the kingdom only with the permission of their employers, they may enter only if they have jobs in Saudi Arabia or can prove business connections. There are no tourists in Saudi Arabia.

Looking like apparitions from another world, Saudi officials clad in flowing snowy robes receive the perspiring traveler in the coolness of Jiddah airport's arrival hall. Everybody is aware that entry to the country is granted more or less as a personal favor. "You have no business to be here," a passport controller snaps at a Palestinian family. "Their papers are in order," he explains to a colleague, "but they are still Palestinians."

Such experiences fit the external image of a dictatorship, and yet the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia does differ from the Shah's regime in Iran: The excesses of Iranian officials appeared to the victim to be directed from above, inherent in the system of oppression and intimidation. Only secondarily did Iranians attribute outrages to the caprice of the executors.

An episode which lately occurred in Jiddah would have been unthinkable in the Shah's Iran: A single policeman guards the banking quarter of the port, where all important financial institutions of the world at large have their branches. And he--Abdallah--was not to be found anywhere.

"Chief to Abdallah, chief to Abdallah," the police radio kept on repeating plaintively, "where are you?" Abdallah remained lost. Again by radio the chief sent some of his men to tearooms where Abdallah was known to hang out, to places where he was known to rest in the shade. But the peace officer took several hours before reporting back to duty. Relief was the chief's principal emotion; Abdallah got away with no more than a mild rebuke.

In Saudi Arabia traditional oriental routine softens the rigors of the regime and even of religion. The system of surveillance works less perfectly than in ideologized one-party states such as Libya and South Yemen. Neither king nor princes are much interested in the actions of their government servants, as long as there is no scandal. It would occur to nobody to blame the monarch for the shortcomings of the bureaucracy.

Yet many foreigners consider their treatment by the Saudis quite ignominious. "Return if you are mindful of your dignity," Cairo's leftist weekly ROSE EL-YUSIF exhorted the 750,000 Egyptians who keep going the infrastructure and administrative apparatus of petrodollar rich Saudi Arabia.

The desert millionaires did not consider the danger unduly great. Should it be possible for physicians, teachers and construction workers from the poor country on the Nile to give up their salaries--princely by comparison to those paid in their Egyptian homeland?



Despite the expectation of prosperity many cannot stand living in their new country. Internally the oil superpower Saudi Arabia is a sink of corruption, incompetence and lawlessness, even by oriental standards.

The smallest service must be obtained from an official for baksheesh. Public contracts are always awarded to the firm which pays the largest bribe to the head of the respective agency. For foreigners a Saudi "sponsor" is indispensable; in fact his name must appear in the entry permit.

The procedure has one advantage for the foreigner: He need pay only one man, the sponsor who will smooth every path. Blessed is he who is sponsored by one of the about 3,000 princes of the royal house or, even better, one of the 31 surviving sons of Saudi Arabia's founder King Abd el-Aziz III, "Ibn Sa'ud." All doors are open to him.

Yet even the most high-born sponsor is unable to protect the foreigner from small daily irritations, caused by sheer slovenliness and incompetence. If, for example, a water main breaks, entire streets are under water for days before the appropriate agency is ready even to acknowledge the occurrence.

Recently the royal household tried to get hold of an official truck to clear the road to Mecca--blocked by an accident--for a royal motorcade. In vain. Appeals via the police radio failed to dig out a tow truck. Finally the order went out over the radio: "Get a tow truck from a foreign firm."

According to an Egyptian architect in Riyadh, the total of daily annoyances of this kind makes "life a painful obstacle course."

Obviously nobody need expect legality on the Western model. Any policeman, for example, may arrest and imprison any citizen at will. The prisoner must remain in the tank with many others until such time as absolutely nobody can be jammed in any longer. Then (and this may take weeks), the prisoners are released just as abruptly and without any reason being given.

Most of those arrested never see a judge. There is no legal aid, but there is the certainty of a beating if someone were to miss one of the daily prayers.

Religion, Islam--these are taken very seriously by the Saudis. If it depended on the frequency of religious instruction, the volume of prayers, they would have to be very near perfection.

Nobody can doubt that they are serious. Questioned about the right approach, a dignified bearded sheikh in Riyadh eyed the stranger with some surprise and asked: "Did you say your prayers today, my son?" Not even waiting for an answer, he pontificated: "If you have prayed, you are bound to follow the right path."

Of course that is reserved to Muslims. Any stranger approaching the holy cities of Mecca and Medina is compelled to turn his car around before they come into view. Mecca and its holy stone, the Ka'aba, and Medina with the

tomb of the prophet and 800,000 foreign pilgrims annually are the spiritual centers of the kingdom. Three important daily papers are published in Mecca, the seat of many pan-Islamic institutions; the strongest transmitter in the kingdom there broadcasts its pious programs.

The powerful state of Saudi Arabia lacks the concept of the nation; religion is the sole spiritual glue of the kingdom, the literal fulfillment of religious prescriptions the first duty of the citizen.

Five times daily the voice of the muezzim calls to prayer from innumerable loudspeakers, audible easily even at the height of traffic noise. All business promptly closes down for half an hour. The local newspapers daily publish the exact times for prayer in the various cities, calculated according to the position of the sun. Except for stock exchange quotations from the world over, the newspapers mainly consist of articles dealing with religion, some sports news, occasionally a political report. As a rule five of the eight pages are devoted to the works of Allah, three to sports.

A Saudi businessman moaned "it is quite insufferable; what is one to do with such a newspaper?"

Matters are hardly better with respect to radio and television. Nearly every second transmission relates to religion or simply broadcasts a sermon.

Virtually every Saudi family therefore owns a video recorder. It has opportunities either illegally to obtain a daring Egyptian television movie with belly dancers or, legally, a Western movie cleaned up by the Saudi censors.

The Saudi censors personally cut scenes from movies which merely hint at an embrace or show a woman in a swimsuit. They manage to cut a 90-minute movie down to a final version lasting 20 minutes.

The lack of information and entertainment creates dissatisfaction: Despite all material wealth the individual is unable to enjoy pleasures which are considered harmless in most other--much poorer--parts of the world.

"Can anybody pray all day long?", a Saudi in Jiddah asked, and immediately supplied the answer: "That's impossible, it is inhuman." As a consequence Saudis largely dissemble in matters of piety.

Many lead a double life, evade all restrictions imposed on them by the government. Example alcohol: "Saudi Arabia," say the residents of the country, "is the largest saloon in the Mideast." Officially, of course, all alcoholic beverages are banned. Foreigners are searched for hidden whisky upon entry.

Instead of the "Bloody Mary" ordered, smiling waiters in the hotel bring a peppery tomato juice which they call "Virgin Mary." The price, though, corresponds to the alcoholic drink; similarly the price of apple juice gets up to the level of champagne prices.

Despite all these restrictions high-proof alcoholic drinks find their way to the walled villas. Alcoholism is punished by flogging, but more and more Saudis are taking to the bottle, often get behind the wheel when drunk and speed into the desert. Twisted heaps of metal, once automobiles, bear mute witness to the end of such drinking bouts.

Because it is rather risky to smuggle high-proof alcohol and prices on the black market are high, Saudis have invented new types of alcoholic enjoyment. In a luxury hotel in Riyadh, for example, respectable middle-class Saudis quite legally order alcohol-free beer made by Guinness or Schlitz and mix it with cheap alcohol-based perfume. Applying some willpower they achieve a state of scented inebriation.

So far the Saudi leadership has failed to stem sexual crimes as it has failed to stop alcohol abuse. No official data are available, but Saudi city dwellers all affirm that they would not dare let their children go into the streets alone--whether girls or boys.

All too frequently, it is said, children have been abducted, taken to the desert, abused and killed. Often even wealthy people pretend to be taxi drivers--for no other purpose than to sexually molest their male or female passengers in the solitude of the desert.

Lebanese newspapers reported that in August 1978 the Indonesian Minister of Manpower and Transmigration lodged an official complaint about the treatment meted out by Saudi employers to some hundreds of female Indonesian household servants: The girls had been kept in confinement and subdued by beatings and threats. According to the minister "it is just about a miracle that the girls at least stayed alive."

Where violence fails, money helps. Many wealthy Saudis like to stroll around the waiting areas of airports and invite young Western air travelers especially to sex parties in their homes. Generous rewards are promised and given.

Many old-time Saudis are horrified at this erosion of morality. Nothing like this existed in the era of King Faysal; that ruler had used a mailed fist.

The same cannot be said of reigning King Khalid. Faysal's successor has severe heart trouble and relies on prayers alone. His authority already seems undermined. The newspapers have virtually ceased quoting him, they merely print his photographs. The princes make the political announcements. They exercise the governing functions and fight for influence and positions of power.

Crown Prince Fahd is certain to be the successor when the king either abdicates or dies. The struggle is concerned with the appointment of the next crown prince.

Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud, minister of defense and aviation and deputy prime minister, considers his chances good. He is expanding his domestic powers in order to succeed his crown prince brother Fahd on day X. Yet this ambition is shared by his nephew, Foreign Minister Sa'ud ibn Faysal Al Sa'ud.

The latter clings to the dying king in order to obtain the following of the king's entourage. An Arab diplomat in Jiddah maintains that "he will never get away with it; he drinks like a fish." Obviously the diplomat still believes that Koran morality is the sole prerequisite for high office in the Holy Land.

The third and most tenacious aspirant to the crown prince's job is Emir Abdallah, supreme commander of the National Guard. As he is the head of the second army, created to keep the first army under surveillance, his chances are by no means negligible.

In view of external and internal dangers the princes have at this time relegated their conflicts to the backburner, concluding "checkbook alliances" instead, to quote Arab leftists in Beirut.

None of the princes has yet found a way out of the prevailing insecurity. While the head of the dynasty, King Khalid, reproaches the United States with "disinterest in the events in Afghanistan and on the Horn of Africa," Fahd--experienced after 17 years of government--attempts to reorient the country's foreign policy following a cautious stocktaking.

After breaking diplomatic relations with Cairo he fears that further concessions to Syrians, Iraqis and Palestinians might make political blackmail of Riyadh fashionable and is therefore trying to gain some elbow room.

That is not easy. Saudi Arabia is unwilling any longer to rely exclusively on the United States as defenders. Washington's inaction at the time the Shah was toppled and the passive American attitude at the Horn of Africa have led the princes to doubt Washington's reliability in the matter of shoring up oriental dynasties. "In view of events in Iran we no longer have a firm policy," Foreign Minister Sa'ud admitted.

Pressured politically by radical Arab countries such as Syria and Libya, threatened in the south by a declared communist regime, Riyadh dissociated itself more from the Egyptian-Israeli peace accord than Washington had expected. Left to its own devices the country would be unable to cope with a military dispute involving heavily armed Iraq, the most radical of the rejectionists.

To put it in another context: The Egyptian-Israeli Treaty, President Carter's achievement of the century--accomplished with an enormous personal effort--could be the lever switching vital Saudi Arabia from its allegiance to the West; in that case the breakthrough from Jerusalem to Camp David would have been merely disastrous!



On the other hand the Saudis contend that they would be risking their conservative monarchy by wholeheartedly joining the radical Syrian-Iraqi camp. The oil superpower thus wavers between one side and the other. Yet this is the power upon which the energy hungry West depends!

Occasionally the constant inter-Arab conflicts yield room for political maneuver. The recent Iraqi-Syrian quarrel and the problems of Iraqi ruler Saddam Husayn offered Saudi Crown Prince Fahd an opportunity temporarily to free his rear by tactical evasion: In future the security organs of the desert kingdom are "to closely cooperate" with their Iraqi colleagues. Still, this does not yet mean a change of partners.

The cards in the old game of oil and money are being reshuffled. An American F-16 squadron, stationed at Najran, close to the border, awaits deployment in North Yemen in case a leftist coup should threaten there.

The Lebanese newspaper EL-SAFIR wrote: "The crisis between Saudi Arabia and South Yemen is quietly worsening." The newspaper claims to know that Somalia is planning joint actions with Saudi Arabia against pro-Soviet South Yemen.

In any case, despite their pro-Egyptian stance, the Somalis are obtaining "all the money we want" (quoting a Somali official in Saudi Arabia). Relations with Egypt also are more friendly than they should be in view of the declared pan-Arab line.

Talking to SPIEGEL military experts in Jiddah claimed that teams of specialists had flown into northern Saudi Arabia in order to maintain rocket emplacements there--specialists from Cairo.

#### Armed Forces' Growth, Weaknesses

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 20 Aug 79 p 115

Text Sheikh Sultan ibn 'Abd al'Aziz Al Sa'ud, defense minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, alerted his troops:

British Lightning bombers and American F-5 fighters, Saudi pilots at the controls, rose in the air to check the desert sky at the borders with South Yemen; Saudi tank personnel in American M-60 tanks secured strategic roads at the Saudi-Yemenite borders, and Saudi artillery laid down fire carpets of high explosive grenades.

What looked, early last month, like preparations for war with Moscow-oriented South Yemen, was really no more than a major exercise of the Saudi army--albeit against an explosive background.

The fall of the Shah and the loss of Iran as the protector of the oil fields and tanker routes on the Persian Gulf has put Saudi Arabia into a political bind. The Saudis now intend to fill the dangerous power vacuum at the Gulf by demonstrating their military power and purchasing new arms for billions of dollars.

The invited rulers of the Gulf states expressed full satisfaction with the military exercise. Sheikh Zayid, head of the United Arab Emirate, said: "Allah is great, and our brother Saudi Arabia is able to defend us all."

Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia boasted that "we are annually spending \$13 billion on our army." In fact the Saudi army is reckoned to be one of the world's finest.

With more than 170 combat planes its air force--equipped with Marwick and Sidewinder rockets--is one of the largest in the Mideast and will be by far the most modern if it realizes its ambition to introduce 60 American F-15 high-performance fighters.

Assisted by the Americans, the Saudi navy now has a combat ready fleet of small, rocket equipped corvettes; The Saudi army has 250 M-60 tanks, the most modern antitank missiles, "Hawk" rockets and radar controlled guns.

However, the 60,000 strong professional army has an illiteracy rate of some 60 percent and is unable to handle the highly complex weapons systems without foreign aid.

French and British technicians, U.S. military advisers and about 9,000 U.S. civilian specialists are training the Saudi forces and instruct them in the use of the weapons.

In any case, many of the men enlisted in desert villages fail to last in the army. According to an American instructor, "they are homesick for their blue sky and their airy housing."

Moreover the Saudis have many disciplinary problems with the men; many soldiers are insubordinate and quite consciously go for a dishonorable discharge from the army, because they expect better opportunities to arise in civilian life.

Yet even a simple Saudi recruit, including the illiterate (distinguished by a shoulder flash) gets more money than any of his confreres in other armies --\$42,000 per month, net.

The Saudi Government now intends to solve the personnel problem by conscripting all men aged 18-35. In the coming 2 years the Saudis want to raise the strength of their combat forces to 100,000, and to 300,000 by 1985.

Housing for the new armies is already under construction with American aid, air bases and roads are being paved, and in the middle of the empty desert new military strong points are rising from the ground.

Each of the 5 new military bases located at the borders with Iraq and South Yemen is to be able to accommodate up to 150,000 men and 150 combat aircraft. According to Saudi military planners, in case of war complete armies could



be carried by means of transport aircraft from one military stronghold to the next--a highly mobile strike force which could constantly be available in the various regions.

Foreign praise is not lacking for so much resolution. "Saudi Arabia is on the way to becoming a significant military power," affirms French Vice-Admiral Maler, chief of the French fleet in the Indian Ocean, and even Israel's former chief of general staff Gur calls the expansion of the Saudi army "sensational."

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## USE OF SUBSIDIES EXAMINED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 13 Jul 79 p 5

[Text] How does the Sudan face the problem of subsidizing commodities? Does the Sudan offer a model for solving the problem of commodity subsidization which is considered to be one of the most important economic problems in Egypt awaiting a solution and a remedy?

What were the steps taken by the Sudanese Government to absorb the effects of lifting the subsidies and the resultant effect on prices?

For an answer to these questions there was a meeting with Faruq al-Maqbul, the Sudanese minister of cooperation, commerce, and supply, which brought out the fact that subsidies in the Sudan do not represent a problem because they are limited to two commodities:

1. Petroleum products
2. Wheat and Flour

Faruq al-Maqbul said that the government found that there is no economic reason to continue subsidization. Continuation would not aid in guiding consumption which is a basic requirement in a stage of development.

The petroleum subsidy had reached 18 million Sudanese pounds as of 31 December 1978. It is estimated that the subsidies would multiply a number of times along with the continued increases in the price of oil. The Sudan is a country which does not produce oil, therefore it is necessary to abolish the subsidy for petroleum because the available financial resources are limited. It is necessary to look to more favorable fields to achieve economic development.

The wheat subsidy almost turned into a problem. Appropriations for subsidy started at around 2 million pounds, then it multiplied five times reaching 10 million pounds during the past year.

It was estimated that the subsidy would rise to 34 million pounds during the present year. Therefore we were in need of a quick surgical operation

to alleviate the increasing burden. The solution is represented by reducing the weight of a loaf of bread. Before lifting the subsidies, a loaf of bread weighed 220 gms; after the subsidies were abolished, it was lowered to 150 gms, while the price was fixed at 3 piastres per loaf.

Concerning bread, Faruq al-Maqbul pointed out that the government found that the subsidy did not reach the consumer because the bakers usurped the greater part of it by reducing the weight of a loaf of bread.

Faruq al-Maqbul says that the removal of the subsidy came about in a framework of a comprehensive reform of pricing policy to achieve a balance in the income of the citizens. Therefore the government decided to limit the prices of agricultural products to that of the export prices. A project has been launched to evaluate and classify jobs. It will include a review of all salaries and wages in the nation. It was partially adopted last year. It will increase the minimum wage to 28 pounds. The salary of a college graduate will be 60 pounds. The project assigns special importance to increasing salaries by the greatest degree at the beginning of the work year, in consideration of the fact that those who work with a limited income will be most affected by removal of the subsidies.

#### Abundant Goods Without Bottlenecking

Are these plans enough to achieve an economic equilibrium guaranteeing the distribution of goods to the citizens, without bottlenecking?

Faruq al-Maqbul said: "That is impossible to achieve without a certain element (the abundance of goods). Therefore these measures must be accompanied by government endeavors to distribute the goods to the consumers, in abundance. The policy of abolishing the subsidies doesn't mean that the government is not effectively fulfilling its role in solving the problems of goods distribution, and guaranteeing that these goods get to citizens in all areas.

In its experiment in subsidizing of commodities, the Sudan treated a problem limited to two commodities only. However, the treatment took in the whole framework of prices in the society as a whole, and was tied to increases in wages and salaries for those with fixed income. It was preceded by a measure to amend the exchange rate of the Sudanese pound with regard to foreign currencies, in May 1978.

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PLAN TO INCREASE PIPELINE CAPACITY READIED

Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 17 Jul 79 p 1

[Text] On the fourth of the next month a joint meeting between the officials of the general organization for petroleum pipe line and a French petroleum company will be held to discuss setting down a detailed plan to increase the capacity of the petroleum pipeline.

The long range plan which the French company will implement aims to increase the pipeline's output to a million tons a year, and to extend the line to Jabal al-Awliya' to meet the needs of the southern region and the White Nile Province.

Mr 'Abd al-Rahman Sulayman, the director general of the public foundation for petroleum pipelines told AL-SAHAFAH that the joint meeting will define the necessary priorities for implementation.

He made it clear that the short term plan aims to raise the capacity from 65 cubic meters per hour to 100 cubic meters per hour, in other words, around 650,000 tons per year, in addition to the pumping of the other products such as unleaded gasoline, jet fuel, and gasoline.

He said that this plan will be implemented within the framework of the economic cooperation protocol between the Sudan and France which was signed last February, and which is to last for a period of 3 years. The agreement is limited to providing support and transferring expertise and technology in the field of operation and maintenance to the organization by means of the resident and visiting experts.

It is worth pointing out that the French petroleum company is considered one of the world's biggest oil companies in the fields of distribution, drilling, transport, marketing, refining, and production. The company owns 25 percent of the shares of the Total company in the Sudan.

AL-SAHAFAH also learned that a group of technicians from the French company had arrived in the country last March to implement this plan.

## CRITICAL SHORTAGE, DISTRIBUTION PROBLEMS EXAMINED

Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 18 Jul 79 p 4

[Text] I have followed the problem of the shortage of radio batteries for some time, and in the final analysis this product has come to be in such short supply, that it has been added to the list of black market goods. We inquire about the hidden causes behind the crisis. The company which produces this product has at its disposal all the capabilities to overcome the difficulties which stand in the way of the turning of the wheels of work, and the outpouring of production. In addition to this, it owns enough raw materials for the coming 2 years.

It is our belief that we will find satisfactory answers to our questions, because if there are no answers from the producing company then at the very least we will get answers from the competent authorities in the ministries of manufacturing and supply. However, we have not received an answer to the questions we have touched on, and meanwhile the crisis becomes more severe each day. As long as the situation is like this, then the one hope which keeps us going is that the responsible authorities will get behind a solution of this crisis by putting their finger on the hidden causes behind it. Just as we mentioned previously, the crisis is becoming more grave and increasing in severity. Lines may still be noticed, but they have assumed another form--degrading man's honor and lessening his character.

The phenomenon lines is a customary sacrifice to the world. However, it is not customary for the company that produces batteries to send a group of its agents to each of the three cities carrying quantities of batteries to distribute in any place under the sun that they choose, after they have informed the masses that they should be calm and stand in nice straight lines. Most of the time the batteries are all gone before many of the people get their share. They return in distress and regret after wasting their valuable time and exposing themselves to the heat of the sun which would result in illnesses, the least of which are headache and sunstroke.

Perhaps the officials of the company took this position to delude the people into thinking that they are determined to supply their needs for batteries.

But this course only confirms the existence of the crisis and worsens it by indicating the lack of batteries in the stores that serve the general public. Their presence is sometimes limited to some of the cooperatives.

The existence of the shortage does not mean that the company has stopped production, or cut its production in half. Rather the level of production is set to cover the needs of all the cities in the region. But for reasons unknown to the company administration itself, the quantities which are produced find their way little by little into the warehouses of the wholesale dealers where the dealers exercise sovereignty in selling them to whoever they wish, and at prices which they impose.

The solution to this predicament would be to have the company supervise the distribution of the daily production to retail merchants mainly, without the wholesale dealers acting as middlemen. In this way it would be possible to overcome the crisis.

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## BRIEFS

**ELECTRICAL POWER SHORTAGES**--The general organization for electricity and water announced, in a proclamation which it issued yesterday to its constituents in the Blue Nile network, which takes in the provinces of Khartoum, al-Jazirah, the Blue Nile, and the White Nile, that a shortage of 20 percent in the production of electricity has suddenly appeared due to a decrease in the forward water level of the al-Rusayris, and Sannar dams for this quarter of the year. The proclamation implored the public associations, government organizations, and factories of both the private and public sectors to be economical in the consumption of electrical energy, and to limit the use of air-conditioners, and electric fans. The committee also prepared a program to curtail electrical services in some areas during the morning and evening hours. [Text] [Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 1 Aug 79 p 1] 9418

**WATER UTILIZATION PLAN**--The competent agencies wound up their discussion of a comprehensive plan to convey Nile waters to irrigation fields and to exploit electrical power up to the year 2000. That is the plan which a number of foreign experts have recently drawn up, the basic elements of which are the establishment of irrigation and hydroelectric power projects in accordance with the Sudan's share of the Nile waters, projects to increase the supply of Nile water, and horizontal and vertical expansion projects on lands that are suitable for irrigation along all the tributaries of the Nile, and projects to dam for irrigation and electrical power in Bahr al-Jabal, in Blue Nile province, on the uppermost reaches of the 'Atbarah river, and on the main Nile. Eng Yahya 'Abd al-Majid, the minister of irrigation, will submit the plan and accompanying remarks to the council of ministers for implementation in its final form, so that development budgets may be drawn up in light of the plan, especially with regard to the agricultural sector and irrigation projects for the coming years. [Text] [Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 30 Jul 79 p 1] 9418

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